Mandas Marikanda v Ruth Makombe and Zimbabwe Women's Microfinance Bank Limited and Abraham K Maguchu

The applicant was employed as Chief Executive Officer of the second respondent (Zimbabwe Women's Microfinance Bank Limited). The first respondent was the chairperson of the board of directors. There was a history of friction between the applicant and first respondent, allegedly dating back to competition for the CEO position. On 1 August 2025, the applicant obtained a magistrates' court interdict requiring the first respondent to "observe corporate governance principles and stop interfering with" the applicant's "scope of work." On 4 March 2026, the applicant was suspended with pay and benefits and a disciplinary hearing was convened for 11 March 2026, with the third respondent as hearing officer. The applicant brought an urgent chamber application seeking an interim interdict to stop the disciplinary hearing pending determination of a declaratory application (HCH1145/26). The first respondent stated she had not been served with the magistrates' court proceedings or order and only saw it when served with the present application. She indicated steps were being taken to seek rescission of that order. The board had resolved to oppose the litigation and authorised the first respondent to represent the second respondent.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction in the first instance to grant interim relief stopping an employer's disciplinary proceedings against an employee
• Whether the matter falls within the exclusive first-instance jurisdiction of the Labour Court under sections 2A(3) and 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]
• Whether the existence of a magistrates' court interdict against the board chairperson transforms what is otherwise a labour dispute into a non-labour matter within the High Court's jurisdiction

1. The point in limine that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter is upheld. 2. The urgent chamber application is struck off the roll for want of jurisdiction. 3. The applicant shall pay the respondents' costs on the ordinary scale.

The Labour Court has exclusive first-instance jurisdiction over labour matters, including disputes concerning employee suspension and disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to sections 2A(3) and 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. Jurisdiction is determined by the substance of the dispute and the nature of relief sought, not by the label attached to the cause. The High Court cannot assume jurisdiction in labour matters merely because relief is framed as a declaratory application under section 14 of the High Court Act or as an interdict. The existence of a prior civil court order interdicting interference with an employee's work does not transform proceedings seeking to stop disciplinary hearings into a non-labour matter, where the gravamen of the dispute remains whether employment-related disciplinary steps should proceed. Concerns about bias, conflict of interest, or procedural unfairness in disciplinary proceedings should be raised before the disciplinary tribunal itself, as part of the labour dispute resolution framework.

The court expressed disquiet about the first respondent's prominent role in launching charges and suspension against the applicant, given the prior confrontation and litigation between them. The court observed that from the standpoint of perception, institutional harmony and minimising allegations of personal vendetta, it is undesirable for disciplinary steps to be driven in a manner that places a person with whom there has been prior confrontation "in the lead," if alternative, less contentious governance arrangements are reasonably available. However, the court noted these are matters that can and should be raised before the disciplinary tribunal itself. The court also noted that the Labour Court routinely issues declaratory-type relief in its daily operations, reinforcing that parties cannot bypass the Labour Court simply because they seek declaratory relief.

This case reinforces the principle established in TN Harlequin that the Labour Court has exclusive first-instance jurisdiction over labour matters in Zimbabwe, and that the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction merely because relief is framed as a declaratory application or interdict. It clarifies that even where a party has obtained a prior civil court order against a board chairperson, this does not transform what is substantively a labour dispute (concerning suspension and disciplinary proceedings) into a non-labour matter. The case provides important guidance on the jurisdictional boundaries between the High Court and Labour Court, and confirms that concerns about bias, conflict of interest, or procedural fairness in disciplinary proceedings should first be ventilated within the labour dispute resolution framework rather than by seeking High Court intervention. It is significant for its application of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] sections 2A(3) and 89(6), and for discouraging attempts to bypass the Labour Court's specialized jurisdiction through creative pleading.