The applicant was the executor dative of the estate of his late uncle, Davison Rangarirai Mudukuti, who died on 20 October 1998. The deceased held a lease agreement with an option to purchase for Stand 8451 Unit K Seke, Chitungwiza. During his lifetime, when promoted to Senior Provincial Administrator and deployed to Marondera, the deceased had invited the third respondent (his friend) to move into his house and look after it. In 1996, when the deceased tried to re-enter and occupy his house, the third respondent resisted removal, claiming he had been offered an option to purchase it. The deceased passed away before evicting the third respondent. The applicant instituted eviction proceedings in the magistrates court. On 30 September 2014 (16 years after the deceased's death), the municipality purported to cancel the deceased's tenancy for allegedly subletting, giving him 30 days to vacate. The municipality then proceeded to offer the property to the third respondent. When this became known during the trial set for 11 February 2015, the applicant sought an urgent interdict to prevent transfer of the property.
The provisional order was granted as amended. The court interdicted the first and second respondents from transferring Stand No 8451 Unit K, Seke Chitungwiza to the third respondent or any third party pending the determination of the magistrates court case No 755/13.
A lease agreement and all rights flowing from it that existed at the time of a leaseholder's death form part of the deceased estate and cannot be cancelled by the lessor without following the proper legal procedures applicable to claims against deceased estates. Where a municipality purports to cancel a lease agreement 16 years after the death of the leaseholder without following estate administration procedures, such cancellation is procedurally irregular and does not defeat the prima facie right of the executor to protect the estate's interests. An executor dative has a prima facie right to protect property forming part of the deceased estate, sufficient to ground a temporary interdict where there is a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm through attempted transfer of the property to third parties, no alternative remedy exists, and the balance of convenience favours the grant of the interdict pending determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
The court observed that it was "curious" and "the stuff for legends" that the municipality purported to terminate the contract of a deceased person and give him 30 days to vacate premises 16 years after his death. The court noted that while the municipality may have valid arguments regarding alleged subletting in breach of the lease agreement, such arguments should be properly ventilated when the respective rights of the parties are being determined in appropriate proceedings with proper joinder of all necessary parties. The court's comments suggest that any substantive determination of rights would require proper joinder of the first and second respondents (the municipality) in proceedings to adjudicate competing claims to the property. The Master of the High Court's report highlighted material disputes of fact regarding the holder of the lease agreement and whether cancellation was done legally, as well as conflicting statements about an alleged oral agreement of sale between the deceased and the third respondent.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean property and succession law as it affirms that municipal authorities cannot unilaterally cancel lease agreements with deceased estates without following proper legal procedures for claims against deceased estates. The case establishes the importance of procedural fairness in dealing with property rights that form part of a deceased estate. It reinforces that executors of deceased estates have locus standi to protect estate assets and that administrative actions taken against deceased persons years after their death, without following estate administration procedures, are procedurally irregular and subject to judicial review. The case also illustrates the proper application of the requirements for temporary interdicts in protecting estate property pending determination of substantive rights.