Lydia Mutandavari and Others v City of Kwekwe and Others

The applicants were 16 registered medical practitioners operating in Kwekwe. On 19 December 2019, they became aware that the City of Kwekwe (first respondent) required them to pay annual business licence fees of $29,400 with effect from 1 January 2020, up from $300 in the previous year. The notification required payment within thirty days. The applicants objected to this drastic increase, which was determined without consultation, particularly when compared to other professionals such as accountants who were required to pay only $3,600. The applicants had previously made written representations on 29 November 2019 objecting to the proposed review of fees, but received no response. They then filed both an application for a declaratur (HC10368/19) and this urgent chamber application on 27 December 2019, challenging the lawfulness of the fee increase and seeking interim relief to prevent enforcement.

• Whether the application was urgent
• Whether the relief sought was speculative and based on imaginary harm
• Whether a court can interdict a lawful process
• Whether the applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies
• Whether the relief sought was fatally defective
• Whether the first respondent complied with section 219(2) and (5) of the Urban Councils Act in implementing the new business licence fees
• Whether the first respondent violated the applicants' constitutional right to fair and prompt administrative justice under section 68 of the Constitution

All preliminary objections raised by the first respondent were dismissed. The matter was to proceed to be argued on the merits. The judgment did not determine the final merits of the application, but only dealt with preliminary points in limine.

A local authority seeking to introduce new business licence fees through a resolution under section 219 of the Urban Councils Act must comply with the statutory requirements of section 219(2) (advertising in two newspaper issues and posting at council offices for at least 30 days) and section 219(5) (repealing or amending the relevant by-law before new tariffs can come into operation). The general powers of council under the Second Schedule must be exercised subject to compliance with the Act. A court has power to interdict an administrative process that is unlawful or does not comply with statutory requirements. The need to act in an urgent application arises when an administrative body takes steps to implement an unlawful decision, not merely when proposals are first announced. Domestic remedies must be clearly outlined and capable of providing effective redress before a court will require them to be exhausted; a provision allowing ministerial intervention mero motu does not constitute a domestic remedy available to applicants.

The court noted its discretion under rule 240 of the High Court Rules to grant relief with appropriate modifications where necessary, even where the relief as framed may be defective. The court observed that requiring applicants to rely on the first respondent's word that it would not enforce unlawful fees was unreasonable where the respondent had already demonstrated willingness to violate the law. The court indicated that the relationship between paragraph 17 of the Second Schedule and section 219 of the Urban Councils Act should be understood as section 198 making clear that general powers must be exercised subject to compliance with the Act.

This case is significant for clarifying the procedural requirements that local authorities must follow when implementing new tariffs, charges and fees under section 219 of the Urban Councils Act. It establishes that councils cannot bypass the statutory safeguards of public notification, consultation and by-law amendment simply by passing a resolution. The judgment reinforces the principle that administrative bodies must comply with both statutory procedures and constitutional rights to administrative justice under section 68 of the Constitution. The case also clarifies the principles governing urgency in applications challenging administrative decisions, and confirms that courts have power to interdict unlawful administrative processes even when undertaken by statutory bodies. It demonstrates judicial willingness to protect citizens from arbitrary and procedurally defective fee increases by local authorities.