The applicant obtained judgment against the 2nd and 3rd respondents on 25 July 2019 for US$20,000.00 arising from a long-running dispute over damages that originated in 2004 (HC 573/04). The applicant instructed the 1st respondent (Sheriff) to execute the judgment at the interbank rate prevailing at the time of execution. However, the Sheriff refused, relying on Statutory Instrument 33 of 2019 section 4, arguing that US dollars and RTGS dollars should be treated at par (one-to-one). The 3rd respondent adopted this position and paid RTGS$20,000.00 to the applicant as full and final settlement. The applicant rejected this payment as insufficient and brought this application seeking enforcement of the judgment at the interbank rate. The 3rd respondent opposed the application, arguing that since the cause of action arose in 2004 (before the effective date of 22 February 2019), the debt should be paid at the one-to-one rate in terms of section 4(1)(d) of SI 33/19.
1. The 1st respondent (Sheriff) was ordered to enforce and execute the judgment given under HC 573/04 within two weeks from the date of the order. 2. The 1st respondent was ordered to execute on the writ and recover the amount outstanding regard being had to the provisions of section 4(1)(e) of SI 33/19 (i.e., at the interbank rate). 3. The 3rd respondent was ordered to pay costs of suit.
The binding legal principle established is that for purposes of section 4 of SI 33/19, the relevant date for determining whether a judgment debt falls under section 4(1)(d) (one-to-one conversion) or section 4(1)(e) (interbank rate) is the date when the judgment creating the obligation to pay was granted, not the date when the underlying cause of action arose. A judgment debt created after the effective date of 22 February 2019 falls under section 4(1)(e) and must be settled at the interbank rate prevailing at the time of execution. The cause of action itself does not create an asset or liability as contemplated by SI 33/19; it is the court order that creates the enforceable obligation to pay that determines the applicable provision.
The court made observations on the principles of statutory interpretation, reiterating that the ordinary, plain, literal meaning of words as popularly understood should be adopted unless that meaning is at variance with the legislature's intention or creates an anomaly or irrational result. The court cited Endeavor Foundation and Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1995 (1) ZLR 339 (S) and Chihava & Ors v The Provincial Magistrate Francis Mapfumo N.O. and Anor 2015 (2) ZLR 31 (CC) in support of this principle. The court also noted that interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to words in a document having regard to the context provided by reading the provision in light of the document as a whole and the circumstances upon its coming into existence.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence as it clarifies the application of Statutory Instrument 33 of 2019 to judgment debts, particularly distinguishing between section 4(1)(d) and section 4(1)(e). It establishes that the critical date for determining which provision applies is when the judgment obligation to pay was created, not when the underlying cause of action arose. The case reinforces the principles of statutory interpretation established in Zambezi Gas and provides important guidance on the enforcement of judgments in the context of Zimbabwe's currency reforms. It protects judgment creditors from having the value of their judgments eroded by exchange rate manipulation based on when the original dispute arose rather than when the enforceable judgment was granted.