The applicant and respondent entered into a joint venture agreement on 17 December 2007 whereby the applicant would effect infrastructural improvements on the respondent's farm called Doddieburn Ranch in Gwanda District and operate an Eco-Tourism project through Shashi-Zambezi t/a Doddieburn Holdings. The lease was valid for 25 years with an option to renew. Clause 3 provided that upon termination, all infrastructure would become the respondent's property but the applicant would be compensated for all improvements including buildings, movables, animals and stock. The agreement contained an arbitration clause (clause 8) for disputes regarding compensation. The respondent terminated the joint venture on 22 October 2014. By consent order in HC 644/15, the dispute was referred to arbitration. Promise Ncube was appointed as arbitrator and made several awards. On 13 December 2017, the arbitrator issued the sixth award directing the respondent to pay the applicant $5,507,980.00 as compensation. The respondent failed to pay its share of the arbitration fees ($2,000 of the $4,000 total), resulting in the arbitrator withholding the written reasons for the award initially.
The arbitral award dated 13 December 2017 was registered as an order of court. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant $5,507,980.00 compensation under clause 3 of the Joint Venture Agreement. The amount was to be paid to the arbitrator through Coghlan and Welsh legal practitioners who would hold it in trust and pay: (a) the sum due to Buffels Vallei 375 (Pty) Ltd in terms of earlier arbitral awards of 20 January 2016 and 14 December 2016; (b) the balance to the applicant. Each party was to bear its own costs but share the arbitrator's costs equally. The arbitral award was declared final and binding between the parties.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) A party cannot rely on its own wrongdoing or default to oppose registration of an arbitral award, applying the maxim 'nemo ex propio dolo consequitur actionem' and 'nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest'; (2) Under Articles 34 and 36 of the Model Law in the Arbitration Act, courts do not exercise appellate power over arbitral awards and will only refuse recognition or enforcement where the award is outrageous in its defiance of logic or acceptable moral standards and constitutes a palpable inequity that would intolerably hurt the conception of justice; (3) Parties cannot raise challenges in registration applications that were not raised before the arbitrator during the arbitration proceedings; (4) The grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards under Article 36 must be interpreted narrowly to protect the institution of arbitration as a voluntary, speedy and cost-effective method of dispute resolution; (5) Where parties agree by consent to a process (such as appointment of a valuer whose determination would be final and binding), they are bound by the results and cannot subsequently challenge the outcome absent exceptional circumstances meeting the high threshold for public policy violations.
The court observed that the provisions of Article 35 requiring production of the original arbitral award or certified copy should not be abused by litigants bent on frustrating the objectives of arbitration. The legislative intent is to prevent fraud or forgery, not to enable parties to delay enforcement through technical objections. The court also noted that adjudication by its very nature means one party must live with disappointment, and that result happens all the time disputes are adjudicated. The court remarked that the respondent's concerns were 'the usual fulminations of a disappointed litigant' and emphasized that the remedy of refusing registration is 'certainly not available to sore losers who simply are unhappy with the arbitral award because it has been made against them.' The court also observed that even where a court does not agree with an arbitrator's decision, it has no power to substitute its own decision.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean arbitration law for reinforcing the narrow grounds upon which courts will refuse to recognize and enforce arbitral awards. It establishes that: (1) parties cannot rely on their own defaults (such as failure to pay arbitration fees) to oppose registration of awards; (2) parties cannot raise new challenges in registration applications that were not raised before the arbitrator; (3) mere dissatisfaction with an award or disagreement with the arbitrator's findings does not constitute grounds for refusal of recognition; (4) the public policy exception under Article 36 must be interpreted narrowly to protect the institution of arbitration; and (5) courts do not exercise appellate jurisdiction over arbitral awards. The judgment reinforces the principle that arbitration is intended to be a final and binding dispute resolution mechanism that should not be undermined by allowing parties to circumvent awards through fanciful defenses.