Liziwe Museredza and 303 Others v Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Water and Rural Resettlement and 10 Others

The applicants were 304 persons residing on a piece of land measuring 161.8238 hectares known as Kingsdale of Johannesburg in Hartley district. In 2001, the State gazetted and compulsorily acquired the land under the land reform programme. The applicants claimed they were allocated stands on the land under this programme, though they produced no documentary proof. Unbeknown to them, the Constitutional Court issued a consent order in CCZ 43/15 on 18 November 2015 declaring the land to be private land vesting in the second respondent (Maparahwe Properties), permitting it to develop and sell stands. The acquisition was set aside. Subsequently, the applicants entered into individual agreements of sale with the second respondent for their respective stands. The applicants claimed they became aware of the CCZ 43/15 judgment by at least July 2017, but only filed this application for leave for direct access on 25 August 2021, seeking rescission of the CCZ 43/15 judgment on grounds it was granted in error as the land was State land under section 72(4)(a) of the Constitution.

• Whether the applicants complied with the Constitutional Court Rules requiring leave for direct access to the Constitutional Court
• Whether the applicants properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction under section 24 of the Constitutional Court Act for rescission of judgment
• Whether the applicants complied with procedural requirements and time limits for bringing a rescission application
• Whether the applicants had locus standi in judicio to seek rescission of the CCZ 43/15 judgment
• Whether the applicants established sufficient prospects of success to warrant granting leave for direct access

The application for leave for direct access to the Constitutional Court was dismissed with no order as to costs.

An application for rescission of a Constitutional Court judgment must comply with applicable procedural rules, not merely invoke the Court's substantive power under section 24 of the Constitutional Court Act. Where the Constitutional Court Rules are silent, Rule 45 incorporates High Court procedure, including Rule 29 which requires rescission applications to be brought within one month of knowledge of the judgment. Failure to comply with time limits without seeking condonation is fatal to an application. Furthermore, to have locus standi to seek rescission under section 24(1)(a) as a 'party affected', an applicant must establish a direct and substantial interest in setting aside the judgment. In the context of land acquired under the land reform programme, this requires proof of 'lawful authority' as defined in the Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act—namely, an offer letter, permit, or land settlement lease issued by the acquiring authority. Agreements of sale with third parties do not constitute lawful authority. Without establishing locus standi and compliance with procedural requirements, an application has no prospects of success, and leave for direct access will be refused as not being in the interests of justice.

The Court made several important observations: (1) Rules of court serve the crucial purposes of facilitating access to justice, creating certainty in procedures, ensuring fairness between parties, and enabling courts to regulate their own processes under their inherent jurisdiction. (2) While the Constitution guarantees access to courts, it does not include the choice of procedure or forum—courts have inherent power under section 173 (in South African jurisprudence cited) to regulate their processes. (3) Rules must be tools to facilitate rather than hinder access to justice, but strong grounds are required before a court will act outside specifically prescribed procedures. (4) Even in constitutional matters where standing is interpreted liberally under section 85 of the Constitution, the Court does not expect only those 'dripping with blood' from actual infringement, but will not entertain applicants who are complete strangers to the matter with no cognizable legal interest. (5) The delay of over four years without explanation demonstrated a lack of vigilance and, citing Grantully (Pvt) Ltd v UDC Ltd, amounted to an abuse of process. (6) The Court noted that sections of a statute must be read together as a whole, not in isolation—thus sections 24 and 26 of the Constitutional Court Act must be read harmoniously.

This judgment is significant in Zimbabwean constitutional and procedural law for several reasons: (1) It clarifies the relationship between substantive jurisdiction (section 24 of the Constitutional Court Act) and procedural requirements (rules of court), establishing that litigants cannot invoke statutory powers without complying with applicable procedural rules. (2) It reaffirms the critical importance of strict compliance with court rules, including time limits, even in constitutional matters, and the necessity of seeking condonation for non-compliance. (3) It demonstrates that while constitutional standing is interpreted more liberally than common law standing, applicants must still establish a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought—they cannot be mere strangers to the impugned decision. (4) It reinforces the definition of 'lawful authority' under the Gazetted Land Act, requiring specific documentation (offer letters, permits, or land settlement leases) to establish rights to occupy land acquired under the land reform programme. (5) It illustrates the gate-keeping function of leave applications in managing access to the Constitutional Court, ensuring only meritorious cases with prospects of success proceed. (6) The judgment balances access to justice with procedural discipline, confirming that constitutional rights of access to courts do not permit litigants to choose their own procedures or disregard established rules.