Li Meng Heng v The State

The appellant, a Chinese national employed as a Human Resources Manager, was convicted of attempted murder and assault. In August 2012, a dispute arose between the appellant and the complainant (also an employee) regarding papers submitted to the Ministry of Labour. The appellant poked the complainant and threw a stone at him. When the complainant fled, the appellant pursued him with a company motor vehicle, taking two other people with her. A chase ensued through public streets, witnessed by several people. On at least three occasions, the appellant drove dangerously close to the complainant, causing onlookers and passengers in her vehicle to fear for safety. The complainant had to use various tactics to avoid being run over. The appellant claimed she only wanted to apprehend the complainant to resolve their differences, not to kill him.

• Whether the evidence supported a conviction for attempted murder
• Whether the appellant had the requisite intention (actual or legal intention) to commit murder
• Whether the test for intention under section 15 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act was satisfied
• Whether the sentence imposed was excessive for a female first offender

The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The appeal against sentence partially succeeded. The sentence was altered by suspending two years instead of one year on the same conditions, resulting in an effective sentence of two years imprisonment (out of four years imposed, with two years suspended for five years).

For a conviction of attempted murder under Zimbabwean law, it is sufficient to prove legal intention as defined in section 15 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. Legal intention consists of two components: (a) awareness that there is a real risk or possibility (other than remote) that one's conduct might cause death or serious injury, and (b) recklessness in continuing with that conduct despite such awareness. A person who directs a moving motor vehicle at another person on multiple occasions, causing witnesses to fear for that person's life, satisfies this test even if the accused claims she did not actually intend to kill. The objective circumstances and the inherent danger of the conduct allow the inference that the accused realized the real risk of causing death but persisted nonetheless.

The court took judicial notice of the dangers posed by road rage as widely reported in the media, though noted this case did not strictly fall into that category as the dispute originated in industrial relations on private property before escalating to public roads. The court expressed that it "escapes logic" why an employer or agent would react so viciously to a worker asserting his labor rights. The court also observed that while the sentence was deserved, being a female first offender who acted impulsively rather than in a planned manner warranted greater leniency through increased suspension of the sentence to ensure the "sting in the sentence is not lost" while recognizing mitigating factors.

This case clarifies the application of section 15 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act regarding the test for intention in attempt crimes. It demonstrates that the subjective test for realizing a real risk or possibility (legal intention) is sufficient for attempted murder convictions, superseding the common law test for constructive intention. The case also addresses sentencing principles for first offenders in cases involving dangerous use of motor vehicles, balancing the seriousness of the offense with mitigating factors such as being a first offender and acting impulsively.