The applicant was convicted of rape in contravention of s 65 of the Criminal Law (Codification & Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. The complainant was a juvenile at the time of the offence and was married to the applicant's younger brother or cousin. On 24 December 2013, while the complainant and her husband were ferrying bricks at their homestead, the applicant requested tobacco. The complainant went into their five-bedroomed house to collect the tobacco for the applicant. The complainant testified that the applicant followed her inside and raped her, including throttling her during the ordeal. She reported the rape to her husband in a tearful state upon his return, and later to her mother in her husband's presence. The applicant claimed he was being falsely implicated due to family disputes over occupation of the family house and use of family fields. A medical report indicated that penetration was definite, though hymenal tears were difficult to elucidate given the complainant was sexually active and had recently given birth. The applicant was convicted and sentenced, and then applied for bail pending appeal against conviction.
The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.
When an application for bail pending appeal is brought under s 123(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], the convicted person bears the burden under s 115C(2)(b) to show on a balance of probabilities that it is in the interests of justice to be released on bail. After conviction, the presumption of innocence no longer applies, and the right to bail does not arise as a fundamental constitutional right but is governed by statute. In determining such applications, courts must consider: (1) the prospects of success on appeal; (2) the likelihood of abscondment; (3) the convict's rights to liberty; and (4) the likely delay before the appeal is disposed of. Grounds of appeal must be clear and specific. Where the trial court has made credibility findings in favor of the complainant, the complainant's testimony is corroborated by other witnesses, and the grounds of appeal are vague and non-specific, the prospects of success on appeal are slim and bail pending appeal should be refused.
The court observed that whenever an application is made to the court based on a specific provision of an enactment, the applicant (especially if represented) should always cite the provision of law relied upon, as this assists the judicial officer to appreciate the basis of the application and the powers that can be exercised. The court also noted that in sexual offence cases involving family members, the finding that a complainant would not risk her marriage by making a false report is a relevant consideration, though it is only one of many factors to be considered alongside the totality of the evidence and probabilities. The court further observed that a neutral medical report that is inconclusive may not materially advance either the prosecution or defence case, and calling the deponent to testify may not further advance the matter.
This case reinforces the principles governing bail pending appeal in Zimbabwean criminal law. It clarifies that: (1) after conviction, an accused no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence or constitutional rights to bail, with bail being governed by statute (s 123(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act); (2) the convicted person bears the burden under s 115C(2)(b) to prove on a balance of probabilities that it is in the interests of justice to grant bail; (3) courts must consider prospects of success on appeal, likelihood of abscondment, the convict's liberty rights, and likely delay in determining appeals; (4) grounds of appeal must be clear and specific; and (5) credibility findings by the trial court and corroborated testimony are significant factors in assessing prospects of success. The case demonstrates the high threshold for obtaining bail after conviction in sexual offence cases.