The applicant and first respondent lived together in an unregistered customary law union and had a tacit universal partnership. When the partnership broke down, they entered into a Deed of Settlement on 16 November 2010 regarding the distribution of their assets, including two properties: No. 21 Smit Crescent, Eastlea (to be split 60%-40%) and Stand No. 222 Helensvale Township (to be split 50%-50%), both to be sold through Kenan Properties. The Deed of Settlement was incorporated into a court order by GUVAVA J. Subsequently, the parties departed from the court order's terms: they sold the Helensvale property through Robert Root instead of Kenan Properties, and agreed that the applicant would buy out the respondent's share in the Eastlea property for US$110,000, with the applicant's share in the Helensvale property being retained by the respondent as part payment. The applicant then sought to enforce this new agreement, arguing it constituted a novation of the Deed of Settlement.
The applicant's application was dismissed with costs.
A court order, including one granted by consent, cannot be novated by the parties through a subsequent private agreement. Novation is an agreement between creditor and debtor that does not include the court as a party. Once an agreement has been incorporated into a court order, that order remains binding and conclusive proof of the matters decided until it is properly varied, set aside or amended by the court. A court cannot enforce a subsequent agreement between parties that conflicts with the terms of a standing court order. Parties who wish to depart from the terms of a court order must apply to the court for its variation or amendment.
The court noted that while the respondent's legal argument was sound, it was not being honestly made as the respondent had participated in departing from the terms of the court order in respect of the Helensvale property. The court observed that parties frequently depart from the terms of court orders in practice, but emphasized that they cannot ask a court to enforce such departures without first seeking variation or amendment of the court order. The applicant's counsel conceded that despite spirited research, no authorities could be found supporting the proposition that a court order can be novated.
This case establishes an important principle in Zimbabwean civil procedure regarding the immutability of court orders and the proper procedure for varying consent orders. It clarifies that parties cannot unilaterally depart from the terms of a court order, even if it was granted by consent and even if both parties agree to different terms. The case reinforces the authority and binding nature of court orders and emphasizes that parties must follow proper legal procedures (variation or amendment applications) rather than attempting to "novate" court orders through private agreements. It provides guidance on the distinction between contractual novation (which is permissible between parties to an agreement) and the improper attempt to novate judicial orders (which is not permissible without court involvement).