The applicant, a legal practitioner, faced two criminal charges in the magistrate's court: (1) disorderly conduct under section 41(b) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act for allegedly saying "get away you stupid" to Constable Brighton Bvaure at Kwekwe Criminal Court premises on 25 April 2021; and (2) resisting arrest under section 176 of the Criminal Law Code for allegedly refusing to be handcuffed by Constable Jasper Nechitima. At trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. After the State closed its case with evidence from three witnesses, the applicant applied for discharge under section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, arguing there was no prima facie case. The magistrate dismissed the discharge application and put the applicant on his defence. The applicant then filed an urgent application in the High Court to stay the criminal proceedings pending finalization of a review application (HC 695/21) challenging the magistrate's ruling.
The urgent application to stay criminal proceedings pending review was dismissed. The criminal trial in the magistrate's court was allowed to proceed.
A superior court should interfere with unterminated proceedings in a lower court only in exceptional circumstances of proven gross irregularity vitiating the proceedings and giving rise to a miscarriage of justice which cannot be redressed by any other means, or where the interlocutory decision is clearly wrong as to seriously prejudice the rights of the litigant. An application to stay proceedings pending review can only succeed if the application for review has prospects of success. At the close of the State case under section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, an accused can only be discharged if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable person might convict. Issues of corroboration, reliability, and credibility of State witnesses are not relevant at the discharge stage unless the evidence is of such poor quality that it cannot be accepted by any reasonable court. As long as there is evidence supporting the charge that incriminates the accused and calls for an answer, it would be incorrect to grant a discharge at the close of the State case.
The court expressed concern that the record of proceedings from the magistrate's court was not placed before it, noting that without the record, the High Court cannot properly perform its constitutionally entrenched review function as it remains "in the dark" about the evidence presented at trial. The court observed that while some aspects of the magistrate's ruling might be "inelegant," this does not amount to a gross irregularity warranting interference. The court emphasized that the decision to stop proceedings in another court cannot be taken lightly and must be well-grounded in law and facts, otherwise it would breed "chaos, anarchy and uncertainty in the lower courts." The court noted that drastic relief to stay proceedings "cannot be just for the asking." The court also noted that even where parties agree that interference is warranted, the court must still independently engage with the legal principles and facts to determine whether intervention is proper.
This case clarifies the principles governing High Court interference with unterminated proceedings in lower courts in Zimbabwe. It reinforces the general rule that superior courts should not lightly interfere with ongoing proceedings in magistrate's courts, and will only do so in exceptional circumstances involving gross irregularities that vitiate proceedings and cause irreparable miscarriage of justice. The judgment provides important guidance on the proper approach to discharge applications under section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, emphasizing that at the close of the State case, the test is whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable court might convict, not whether the evidence is credible, reliable, or corroborated. The court will not analyze the probative value of evidence or resolve contradictions at this stage. The case also emphasizes that the power to interfere with ongoing proceedings is not conferred by consent of parties, but must be grounded in established legal principles. It serves as a cautionary statement against allowing frequent interruptions of lower court proceedings through review applications, which would jeopardize finality in litigation and compromise the efficacy of the court system.