Leah Nachipo and Gerald Nachipo v Admire Maticha, Trevor Mwaramba, Cleopas Manyika, Lewis Chasakara, Wonder Mushure and City of Harare N.O.

The appellants owned a residential property in Shawasha Hills, Gletwyn Township, Harare, which they converted into a wedding venue. The respondents were neighbouring property owners who complained about noise pollution from wedding functions. On 17 August 2018, residents submitted a petition to the City of Harare (sixth respondent) against noise pollution from the appellants' property. Despite the petition, on 12 June 2019, the City of Harare granted a permit to the appellants to operate their property as a wedding and events venue. The respondents sought to appeal this decision but had exceeded the time limit. They applied to the Administrative Court for condonation and extension of time to appeal. The Administrative Court granted the application on 25 September 2020, finding the respondents were not notified of the permit application, were not in willful default, and had reasonable prospects of success. The appellants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court without seeking leave to appeal.

• Whether leave to appeal was required before noting an appeal against an interlocutory order of the Administrative Court
• Whether section 20(2) of the Administrative Court Act [Chapter 7:01] or section 61 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act [Chapter 29:12] governed the appeal procedure
• Whether the grant of condonation and extension of time to appeal constituted an interlocutory order requiring leave to appeal

1. The point in limine (preliminary point) was upheld. 2. The matter was struck off the roll. 3. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of suit.

Section 20(2) of the Administrative Court Act [Chapter 7:01] requires leave to appeal from interlocutory orders of the Administrative Court unless another enactment specifically provides otherwise. Section 61 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act [Chapter 29:12] does not displace this requirement; it merely restricts appeals under that Act to points of law and questions of admissibility of evidence, but does not address the procedural requirement of obtaining leave for interlocutory appeals. These provisions are complementary and must be read together. An appeal against an interlocutory order (such as a grant of condonation and extension of time to appeal) from the Administrative Court to the Supreme Court requires leave, and failure to obtain such leave renders the appeal fatally defective and subject to being struck off.

The Court observed that a wholly unrestricted right to appeal from every judicial decision would be problematic, as wealthy parties could abuse the process by appealing every ruling, causing injustice to less wealthy parties and delaying justice. The requirement for leave to appeal interlocutory orders serves as a filter to ensure only the most deserving cases proceed on appeal. The Court also noted the rule of statutory interpretation that the general gives way to the specific, which in this case favors section 20 of the Administrative Court Act as it deals directly with leave to appeal interlocutory orders, whereas section 61 does not mention the subject matter.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative law as it clarifies the procedural requirements for appealing interlocutory orders from the Administrative Court to the Supreme Court. It establishes the mandatory requirement to obtain leave to appeal interlocutory orders under section 20(2) of the Administrative Court Act, and that this requirement is not displaced by section 61 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act. The case provides important guidance on statutory interpretation where two provisions appear to overlap, demonstrating how courts should read complementary provisions in pari materia. It reinforces the principle that the requirement for leave to appeal interlocutory orders serves to filter appeals and prevent abuse of process and delay of justice.