The Law Society of Zimbabwe, the regulatory body for legal practitioners in terms of the Legal Practitioners Act [Chapter 27:07], brought an urgent application seeking to declare the respondent, Tafadzwa Calvin Sengwe (a legal practitioner practicing as "Sengwe Law Chambers"), incapable of managing his own affairs and to place him under curatorship. The application was based on: (a) pending sequestration proceedings filed against the respondent under HC 5662/18; and (b) the respondent's alleged failure to account for trust funds following three complaints received by the Law Society. The Law Society alleged possible misappropriation of trust funds and contravention of money laundering legislation. A supplementary affidavit was filed alleging further non-compliance including outstanding debts of $115,000.00 and US$93,000.00, default on NASSA payments for over 9 months, and failure to register for and pay VAT and other taxes. The respondent opposed the application on preliminary grounds including lack of urgency and jurisdiction, noting that similar proceedings (LPDT 12-17) had been withdrawn by the Law Society after being found not urgent, and that the matters arose between 2016-2017.
The application was dismissed with costs on a party to party scale to be paid by the applicant (Law Society of Zimbabwe).
The High Court has jurisdiction to hear urgent applications concerning legal practitioners, including curatorship applications, based on its constitutional original jurisdiction in civil matters (s 171(a) of the Constitution) and s 13 of the High Court Act, particularly where no other forum is available for urgent interlocutory relief between sittings of the Law Society Disciplinary Tribunal. However, where an alternative remedy exists through the Law Society Disciplinary Tribunal and the matter is not truly urgent (evidenced by significant time delays and previous withdrawn proceedings on similar grounds), the proper forum for determining whether a legal practitioner is incapable of managing their affairs is the Disciplinary Tribunal, where the practitioner can receive a fair hearing before any determination is made. An application should ordinarily rise or fall on the founding affidavit, and supplementary affidavits introducing new causes of action are improper.
The court observed that the Law Society acted without malice and was duty-bound to investigate complaints and take action to protect the profession and the public when certain factors came to its attention. The court expressed the view that granting curatorship relief in these circumstances, without a full hearing before the Disciplinary Tribunal, would be analogous to convicting an accused person in a criminal case before they present their defense. The court also commented that subsequent investigations conducted after filing the founding affidavit had the danger of being misinterpreted as an attempt to bolster a case already placed before the court.
This case clarifies the jurisdictional relationship between the High Court and the Law Society Disciplinary Tribunal in Zimbabwe. It establishes that while the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hear urgent applications relating to legal practitioners (particularly interlocutory matters between Tribunal sittings), such applications must still satisfy substantive requirements. The case emphasizes that where an alternative statutory remedy exists through the Disciplinary Tribunal and matters are not truly urgent, the proper forum for disciplinary matters is the specialized Tribunal where the practitioner can have a fair hearing. It reinforces principles of procedural fairness and the rule against determining matters without allowing the affected party to properly present their case. The judgment also addresses the proper scope of supplementary affidavits, holding they should not introduce entirely new causes of action.