The plaintiff and respondent were granted a divorce order by consent in HC7249/99. The consent order included terms for post-divorce spousal maintenance whereby the plaintiff was to pay maintenance to the defendant until she died, remarried, or began living with another man as husband and wife. The plaintiff failed to pay maintenance religiously, accruing arrears of approximately $35,000. The defendant obtained writs of execution and registered caveats against the plaintiff's immovable property (Title Deed 9682/97) to enforce the arrear maintenance. Over 10 years after the divorce, the plaintiff approached the court seeking annulment of the consent paper, declaring the writs null and void, removal of caveats, and transfer of shares in CH Heaven (Pvt) Ltd. The plaintiff claimed his circumstances had changed materially: he had remarried a young hairdresser, his jewellery business had shut down, he had limited employment opportunities in geology/mining given his qualifications and the sector challenges, he had incurred huge debts, sold some properties, and was diagnosed with cancer. The defendant was gainfully employed, earning approximately $3,000 per month, had sold part of her awarded property and invested the proceeds, and received rental income.
1. The maintenance order granted in terms of the consent order in HC7249/99 was discharged with effect from the date of the order. 2. The application for declaration that writs of execution and caveats registered against the plaintiff's Title Deed 9682/72 be declared null and void was dismissed. 3. By consent, the defendant was ordered to transfer shares in CH Heaven (Pvt) Ltd within 7 days of issuance of the order. 4. Each party to bear its own costs.
Seeking annulment of an entire consent order to effect variation of a maintenance clause is incompetent where only specific terms are under scrutiny. Under section 9 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:13], variation, suspension or rescission of a maintenance order requires 'good cause', which means any reason rendering it equitable to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant. Courts must consider: (1) the change in financial circumstances of the person ordered to pay maintenance, and (2) their ability to provide maintenance. Remarriage constitutes a change of circumstance that may warrant variation or discharge of maintenance, as it is unrealistic to expect a former spouse to maintain the first family at the same standard regardless of subsequent commitments. A party who has defaulted on an extant maintenance order cannot obtain relief declaring writs of execution null and void or removing caveats registered to enforce arrear maintenance, as this would frustrate execution of valid court orders and condone contempt of court. Discharge of maintenance operates prospectively from the date of the order and does not exonerate liability for arrears already accrued.
The court observed that the plaintiff's failure to fully disclose what happened to proceeds from the sale of valuable immovable property was viewed as calculated to frustrate the extant court order. The court noted that failure to pay maintenance as ordered is a criminal offence. The court emphasized that it is duty bound to control court process and would not facilitate indefinite non-compliance with court orders. The court remarked that the plaintiff was not a man of straw despite his claims of financial hardship. The court took judicial notice of current economic hardships faced by the business community and society at large in Zimbabwe. The court noted that the defendant, through her candid testimony, did not seek to hide anything regarding her financial standing, and had shown innovativeness in investing proceeds from property sales.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean matrimonial law as it clarifies the proper procedure for seeking variation of maintenance orders incorporated in consent divorce decrees. It affirms that annulment of an entire consent order is not competent where only specific clauses are challenged. The judgment provides guidance on the application of section 9 of the Matrimonial Causes Act regarding what constitutes 'good cause' for variation of maintenance orders, and balances the competing interests of enforcing valid court orders against recognizing genuine changes in circumstances. It establishes that courts will not assist parties in frustrating execution of valid maintenance orders, but will discharge prospective maintenance obligations where changed circumstances (remarriage, age, health, financial decline) warrant such relief while preserving rights to arrear maintenance already accrued.