The applicant was convicted by the Magistrates Court at Murewa of stock theft as defined in s 114(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. On 25 August 2014, the applicant, together with two accomplices, stole two beasts belonging to the complainant and slaughtered them. The beasts were stolen from the complainant's cattle pen at Mupfuti Farm in Murewa. The applicant was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment. The applicant's defense was that he did not participate in the theft but merely brought fuel to his friend Fungai Makoni at Murewa and then returned to Harare. However, evidence showed he was in constant telephone communication with Makoni, made a u-turn to avoid a police roadblock, and fled from police when his accomplice was arrested. He appealed against both conviction and sentence and also applied for review of the Magistrate's proceedings. He then sought admission to bail pending determination of his appeal and review application.
The application for bail pending appeal and review was dismissed.
In applications for bail pending appeal after conviction, the onus is on the applicant to establish positive grounds for the grant of bail. Bail is not a right in such circumstances. The proper approach is that in the absence of positive grounds for granting bail, it will be refused. The court must balance the liberty of the individual against the proper administration of justice, weighing factors including: (1) reasonable prospects of success on appeal; (2) seriousness of the offence; (3) likelihood of absconding (which increases where prospects of success are weak and the sentence is lengthy); and (4) likely delay before the appeal can be heard. The applicant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, and even where such prospects exist, bail may be refused in serious cases. The principles applicable to bail after conviction differ significantly from bail pending trial, where the presumption of innocence applies.
The court observed that the applicant's explanation for his conduct presented "a thoroughly unconvincing version" that would enjoy no prospect of acceptance by the appellate court. The court noted that the evidence of the applicant's flight from police when his accomplice was arrested meant "he cannot be trusted now after being convicted and sentenced." The court also commented that there was unlikely to be considerable delay in setting down the appeal if the applicant's legal representatives pushed for the appeal to be given a date, since the record of proceedings was already ready as part of the bail application papers.
This case reinforces the established principles in Zimbabwean law regarding bail applications after conviction. It demonstrates the high threshold applicants must meet to obtain bail pending appeal, emphasizing that bail after conviction is not a right but a discretionary remedy requiring positive justification. The case illustrates how courts balance multiple factors including prospects of success, seriousness of offence, flight risk, and sentence length. It is significant for its application of the principle that the weaker the prospects of success, the greater the inducement to abscond, particularly in serious cases with lengthy sentences. The case serves as an important precedent for the stringent approach courts take to post-conviction bail applications in Zimbabwe.