The plaintiff was appointed Curator Bonis of the estate of the late Muchineripi Rishoni Gonyora by the Master of the High Court. In that capacity, he rendered professional services on behalf of the estate. On 3 March 2010, at a taxation hearing, he was awarded fees for his duties, which were confirmed by the court on 28 October 2010. The plaintiff was subsequently removed from office as curator bonis on 19 May 2006 on the grounds that his appointment had been irregular. The plaintiff issued summons for payment of US$160,788.98 in fees. After the defendant entered an appearance to defend, the plaintiff applied for summary judgment. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff had disposed of estate property (immovable property and shares) without proper consent of beneficiaries and based on fraudulent documents. Criminal proceedings for fraud were pending against the plaintiff in the Magistrates Court. The defendant sought to set off the value of the disposed properties (valued at US$200,000 for the immovable property and US$19,044.93 for shares) against the plaintiff's claim.
The application for summary judgment was dismissed with costs.
A defendant can resist summary judgment by establishing a prima facie defence, which requires alleging material facts that, if proven at trial, would entitle the defendant to succeed. A plaintiff who served as curator bonis cannot lawfully seek payment for duties performed when there are allegations that he committed fraud in the execution of those same duties. Such allegations constitute a prima facie defence that must be resolved through trial rather than summary judgment. The obligation to account for estate property allegedly disposed of fraudulently provides a valid basis for defence even if the counterclaim amounts to damages rather than a liquidated set-off.
The court made observations regarding the nature of set-off at common law, noting that it is a method by which mutual debts which are liquidated and due are extinguished. The court also observed that what the defendant claimed as set-off in fact amounted to a claim for damages rather than a liquidated claim. The court referenced Van Winsen, Ekstein & Cilliers on the principles governing set-off and postponement of judgment where a counterclaim is raised. The court noted that the valuation of the property disposed of (US$200,000) exceeded the plaintiff's claim for fees (US$160,788.98), suggesting that if established, this would provide a full shield to the plaintiff's claim.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean civil procedure as it clarifies the requirements for resisting an application for summary judgment. It demonstrates that even where a plaintiff has obtained a confirmed taxation of fees and a court order, a defendant can resist summary judgment by raising a prima facie defence based on allegations of fraudulent conduct by the plaintiff in the performance of the duties for which fees are claimed. The case also illustrates the principle that a person seeking payment for professional services rendered as a fiduciary cannot enforce payment when serious allegations of fraud in the execution of those duties remain unresolved and require investigation at trial.