Kadoma City Council v Zimbabwe Urban Council Workers Union Kadoma Branch and The Sheriff of Zimbabwe

The applicant, Kadoma City Council, brought an urgent chamber application to prevent the removal of its property placed under attachment by the Sheriff on 15 June 2016. The attachment arose from a writ of execution issued on 15 April 2016 in case HC 3718/14, which had registered an Arbitral Award. The Arbitral Award ordered a 40% wage increment for non-managerial staff with effect from August 2013. The applicant had filed both an appeal and an application for rescission of the judgment registering the Arbitral Award (case HC 6195/16). The applicant argued that the Arbitral Award did not specify a monetary value, only a percentage, and that the writ of execution was fraudulently obtained as it did not comply with Rules 322 and 323 requiring claims sounding in money. The applicant also argued that it never opposed registration of the award and did not attend the quantification process, though they were aware it was proceeding.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to suspend execution of an Arbitral Award registered under labour legislation
• Whether an appeal or application for rescission of judgment has the effect of suspending execution
• Whether the writ of execution was fraudulently obtained on the basis that the Arbitral Award did not specify a monetary value
• Whether the application should have been brought in the Labour Court rather than the High Court

The interim relief sought by the applicant was dismissed with costs.

An appeal to the Labour Court against an arbitrator's decision under section 98(10) of the Labour Act does not suspend the decision appealed against. Applications to suspend or stay execution of an arbitral award pending appeal must be brought in the Labour Court under section 92E(3) of the Labour Act, not the High Court. The High Court does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of an arbitral award - that is the exclusive province of the Labour Court. A mere application for rescission of judgment or filing of an appeal does not have the automatic effect of suspending execution of an arbitral award.

The court observed approvingly the dictum from Tuso v City of Harare that apart from review jurisdiction, the Labour Court has appeal jurisdiction which the High Court does not have, enabling the Labour Court to combine both appeal and review proceedings and determine labour matters more expeditiously and exclusively than the High Court. The court also noted with approval the principle from Brown v Dean (1909) that in the interests of society as a whole, litigation must come to an end, and when a litigant has obtained judgment in a court of justice, he is entitled by law not to be deprived of that judgment without solid grounds. The court also implicitly rejected the applicant's allegation of fraud, noting that the applicant was fully aware that quantification of the award was going to proceed and that the arbitrator's decision for a 40% wage increment was clear.

This case reinforces important principles in Zimbabwean labour law regarding: (1) the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court over labour disputes and appeals from arbitral awards; (2) the proper forum for applications to suspend execution of labour arbitral awards; (3) the limited role of the High Court in labour matters beyond review jurisdiction; and (4) the principle that appeals and rescission applications do not automatically suspend execution. It demonstrates the court's reluctance to interfere with labour awards on procedural grounds when the substantive issue falls within the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction.