Juddy Chimango and Patricia Chireshe v International Committee of the Red Cross

The applicants sought registration of a Labour Court order (LC/H/593/15) in the High Court in terms of section 92B(3) and (4) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. The Labour Court had previously corrected an arbitrator's award by including quantified damages for unfair dismissal. The Labour Court awarded the first applicant USD $13,222.57 and the second applicant USD $14,933.21, totaling USD $28,155.78. The applicants approached the High Court through a chamber application served on the respondent on 9 October 2015. The respondent filed an opposing affidavit on 16 October 2015, objecting primarily on grounds of improper form (failure to use Form 29 as required by Rule 241(2)) and challenging the substantive merits of the Labour Court's award on damages.

• Whether the applicants used the correct procedural form for registration of a Labour Court order in the High Court
• Whether failure to use Form 29 is fatal to the application
• Whether the High Court can review or question the merits of an extant Labour Court order when approached for registration under section 92B of the Labour Act
• Whether the court's inherent powers and procedural rules allow for flexibility in procedural irregularities where no prejudice is suffered

1. The Labour Court Judgement Number LC/H/593/15, under case number LC/H/APP/453/15 dated 21 August 2015, be and is hereby registered as an order of the High Court; and 2. The respondent shall pay costs of this application at the legal practitioner and client scale.

When a party seeks registration of a Labour Court order under section 92B(3) and (4) of the Labour Act, the High Court's function is limited to registration of extant orders and does not extend to reviewing the merits of those orders. The proper avenue for challenging Labour Court decisions is appeal to the Supreme Court under section 92F. Procedural irregularities, such as failure to use a prescribed form, are not fatal to an application where: (a) the respondent has been properly served and given opportunity to respond; (b) no prejudice has been suffered; and (c) the interests of justice favor proceeding. The High Court has inherent constitutional power under section 176 to regulate its own processes, and Rules 4C, 106, and 229C permit departure from strict procedural requirements in appropriate circumstances.

The court observed that while rules of court ought to be strictly adhered to, such adherence should never be allowed to stand in the way of justice. The court emphasized that section 92B(3) does not prescribe a specific procedure for registration, and that as a matter of practice, litigants have generally adopted the chamber application procedure with notice to the other party, which the court has accepted. The court distinguished the case of Base Minerals Zimbabwe (Private) Limited v Peter Valentine & Ors HH 559/14, noting that in that case there was neither a chamber nor court application identifiable, and thus no basis for invoking the flexible procedural rules. The court cited with approval the reasoning in Stanley Machote v Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund regarding the distinction between a court's jurisdiction, inherent procedural powers, and inherent substantive powers under section 176 of the Constitution.

This case clarifies important procedural aspects of registering Labour Court orders in the High Court under section 92B of the Labour Act. It establishes that: (1) strict compliance with procedural forms is not required where no prejudice results and justice demands flexibility; (2) the High Court's role in registration applications is ministerial, not appellate - it cannot review the merits of extant Labour Court orders; (3) the proper remedy for challenging Labour Court decisions is appeal to the Supreme Court under section 92F, not opposition to registration; (4) the constitutional inherent powers of the High Court under section 176 include the power to regulate its own processes flexibly in the interests of justice. The case reinforces the principle that procedural technicalities should not obstruct substantive justice, and demonstrates the court's willingness to invoke Rules 4C, 106, and 229C to manage its processes pragmatically.