The appellant (Joyce Makumbe) is the mother of a minor female child, Tafadzwa Munzvenga, who was 2 years old at the time of the custody dispute. The respondent (Andrison Munzvenga) is the father of the child. The parties were not married to each other. The respondent had lived with the child from when she was 8 months old while the mother attended nursing school. The Magistrates Court sitting at Bulawayo on 16 July 2014 awarded custody of the minor child to the respondent (father). The appellant appealed this decision to the High Court. The respondent alleged in his founding affidavit that he feared the mother would expose the child to human trafficking and baby dumping, and that he was permanently employed and could fully support his daughter.
The appeal was allowed. The order of the court a quo was set aside and substituted with: (a) Custody of the minor child Tafadzwa Munzvenga awarded to the appellant (mother); (b) The issue of maintenance for the child referred back to the magistrates court for proper assessment after consideration of all relevant factors; (c) The respondent to pay the costs of the appeal.
In Zimbabwe, custody rights in relation to a child born out of wedlock vest exclusively in the mother of the child. The father of a child born out of wedlock has no inherent custody rights and is equated to any third party seeking custody. The father (or any third party) can only interfere with the mother's custody rights in the interests of the child when those rights are not being exercised properly. The trigger that warrants interference must be an allegation supported by evidence that the mother's rights are not being exercised properly, and it is therefore in the interests of the child that these rights be interfered with. A father of a child born out of wedlock cannot succeed in a custody application simply by alleging that he is the father, or that he is wealthier than the mother, or that he pays maintenance. The court will not substitute its own decision for that of the mother in whom parental authority vests where the mother has not been shown to be incompetent to make decisions regarding the child.
The court noted that if the law is to be changed with regard to fathers of children born out of wedlock having custody rights, such a decision must be that of the legislature and not the court. The court also observed that the mere fact that the court may reach a different conclusion as to where the best interests of the minor child lie does not automatically make the court the best arbiter of such an issue. The court emphasized that it cannot assume the role of substituting its decision for that of the person in whom parental authority vests where such person has not been shown to be incompetent.
This case reinforces the fundamental principle in Zimbabwean family law that mothers of children born out of wedlock have primary custody rights. It emphasizes that fathers of such children have no inherent custody rights and are treated as third parties who must establish that the mother is not properly exercising her parental authority before custody can be removed from her. The judgment serves as an important reminder to courts that they cannot simply substitute their own decision for that of the person in whom parental authority vests without proper grounds being established. It protects mothers from having their custody rights interfered with merely because the father may be wealthier, pays maintenance, or believes he can provide better care, absent proof that the mother is incompetent or not exercising her rights properly.