Applied for the proposition that rule 449 enables the court to revisit orders and judgments given in error to correct injustice, and for the three requirements…
Cited for the three requisites that must be satisfied for relief in terms of r 449.
Cited for the well-established requirements for rescission of default judgments in terms of r 449(1)(a) of the High Court Rules 1971.
Court applies the principle that rule 449 goes beyond formal errors and is designed to correct errors made by the court, including substantive errors resulting…
Cited for the proposition that Rule 449 enables the court to revisit its orders to correct those given in error where allowing them to stand would result in an…
Cited for the purpose of Rule 449 being to prevent the continued existence and perpetuation of an obvious judicial injustice.
Cited for the requirements that must be met for rescission under rule 449: that the judgment was erroneously sought or granted, was granted in absence of the…
Cited to support the proposition that Rule 449 goes beyond the ambit of mere formal or technical defects in a judgment or order.
Cited for the principle that allowing an order obtained in the absence of an affected party to stand would result in injustice and destroy the very basis upon…
Cited for the principle that rule 449 is designed to correct errors made by the court itself and not an omnibus to bring new issues and parties before the…
Court applies the test for the scope of rule 449(1) and the principle that the rule is designed to correct errors made by the court itself.
Cited for the requirements that must be met for rescission to be granted in terms of rule 449: that the judgment must have been erroneously sought or granted,…
Cited for the proposition that issues raised in opposition will be considered when the merits of the underlying matter are considered.
Applied for the principle that rule 449 enables the court to revisit its orders to correct or set aside judgments given in error where allowing them to stand…
Cited for the functus officio doctrine that a court's jurisdiction is exercised upon pronouncing its judgment on a matter.