This was a chamber application before the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe. The applicant, Jonathan Nathaniel Moyo, faced criminal charges levelled by the first respondent (Sergeant Chacha). The applicant sought interim relief pending the determination of the main constitutional application (CCZ 73/2016). The applicant and the fourth respondent (Prosecutor General) consented to a draft order staying criminal proceedings pending the main case. The third respondent indicated he would abide by the Court's decision. However, the first and second respondents (Sergeant Chacha and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission) persisted in opposing the order, despite being unable to provide any legal basis for their opposition when asked by the Court.
The Court granted an order in terms of the consent draft order between the applicant and the fourth respondent: (1) The Registrar was directed to set the matter down for hearing on an urgent basis; (2) Pending determination of case CCZ 73/2016, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed. An agreed timetable was established for filing of pleadings and setting down the main application. Costs were reserved as costs in the cause.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The Prosecutor General, as dominus litis in criminal prosecutions, has the ultimate authority to decide whether to proceed with or concede to applications relating to criminal proceedings; (2) Investigative bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission and police lack locus standi to drive criminal proceedings forward without the support of the Prosecutor General; (3) Where there is a real possibility that due process was not complied with in criminal proceedings, and the Prosecutor General concedes on sound legal grounds, a chamber judge may grant interim relief staying criminal proceedings pending full constitutional determination by the Constitutional Court.
The Chief Justice made the non-binding observation characterizing the first and second respondents' attitude as "Why be difficult when one can be impossible?", suggesting their continued opposition was driven by something other than legal considerations. The Court also observed obiter that a definitive decision on whether there was actual failure of due process could only be determined by the full Constitutional Court (as opposed to a judge sitting in chambers), and that it would be for the Constitutional Court to decide what remedies are available to the applicant if procedural failures are found.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean constitutional law as it affirms the principle that the Prosecutor General, as dominus litis, has ultimate authority over criminal prosecutions and that investigative bodies (such as the Anti-Corruption Commission) lack locus standi to continue prosecutions without the Prosecutor General's support. The judgment also demonstrates the court's willingness to grant interim relief where there are prima facie concerns about due process violations, pending full constitutional determination. It reinforces the separation between investigative and prosecutorial functions in the criminal justice system.