The applicant, a self-actor, sought an interdict to prevent eviction from Stand No. 8004 Cold Comfort, Tynwald South, Harare, and to reverse the transfer of the property. He claimed the property was sold without his knowledge or consent while he was out of the country, and that he had never granted power of attorney to anyone. The chronology of events showed that: the second respondent had attached the immovable property following the applicant and others defaulting on a deed of settlement that they had executed through their legal practitioners; the property was sold through the Sheriff of the High Court; the first respondent purchased the property and acquired legal title; the first respondent successfully obtained an eviction order against the applicant and his wife in HC 7997/16; after being evicted on 21 December 2016, the applicant and his wife broke into the house and resettled themselves; contempt of court proceedings were filed against them in HC 395/17; the applicant had obtained an interim interdict from Tagu J which was subsequently set aside in HC 10129/17 under Order 49 r 449(1) of the Rules of Court. Throughout the legal process, the applicant had been legally represented together with his wife (the fourth respondent).
The application was dismissed with costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) To obtain an interdict, an applicant must establish three requirements: a clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. (2) A party who has been legally represented throughout legal proceedings and who consented to orders through the agency of their legal practitioners cannot subsequently claim that actions were taken without their knowledge or consent. (3) Where a respondent has secured eviction through due process of law, this cannot form the basis for granting an interdict against that eviction. (4) An applicant who has filed several suits and has other remedies available cannot satisfy the requirement that there is no alternative remedy for the grant of an interdict.
The court observed that where the right is not clear though prima facie established, an interdict will be granted only where the continuance of the thing against which the interdict is sought would cause irreparable harm to the applicant. Where the risk of harm is not apparent, there is no ground for granting an interdict, as the applicant can, if he does suffer harm as a result of the respondent's actions and if those actions are unlawful, sue for damages. The court also noted that the basis of an interdict is the threat, actual or implied on the part of the defendant that he is about to do an act which is in violation of the plaintiff's rights and that actual infringement is merely evidence upon which the court implies an intention to continue in the same course.
This case reinforces the strict requirements for obtaining an interdict in Zimbabwean law and illustrates the principle that parties cannot disavow actions taken on their behalf by their duly appointed legal representatives. It demonstrates that a party who has participated in legal proceedings through legal representation cannot later claim ignorance or lack of consent to those proceedings. The case also illustrates that where due process has been followed in obtaining eviction, this cannot form the basis for an interdict, and parties who have multiple legal remedies available cannot claim absence of alternative remedies as a ground for interdictory relief.