John Marinda and Others v Minister of Local Government and Public Works and National Housing and Others

The position of Chief Chirumhanzu became vacant following the death of the substantive chief in January 2019. On 6 June 2024, the first and second respondents convened a meeting for nomination of a new chief, at which the third respondent (Abraham Marufu/Abraham Nyamande) was recommended for appointment. The President appointed the third respondent as substantive Chief Chirumhanzu on 7 January 2025 in terms of section 3(1) and (2) of the Traditional Leaders Act and section 283(a)(i) of the Constitution. The applicants, descendants of Nherera (eldest son of the first Chief Chirumhanzu), filed this application on 27 February 2025 seeking to set aside the nomination proceedings of 6 June 2024 under the Administrative Justice Act. They alleged serious irregularities including that inappropriate persons attended the meeting, that the wrong house was selected under the customary rotation system, and that they were denied opportunity to speak. The applicants did not cite the President or seek to set aside his appointment of the third respondent. Multiple procedural irregularities arose: the respondents filed only an opposing affidavit without a notice of opposition on 19 March 2025, failed to serve it within seven days, and failed to file a certificate of service within 48 hours as required by Rule 59(7)-(8). The third respondent's legal representative changed, and new opposing papers were filed on 16 June 2025 without leave of court.

• Whether the respondents' opposition was validly filed in compliance with Rule 59(7)-(8) of the High Court Rules, 2021
• Whether the respondents were barred under Rule 59(9) for non-compliance
• Whether the bar should be uplifted/removed
• Whether the third respondent could file a second set of opposing papers without leave of court under Rule 59(12)
• Whether the application was moot given the President's appointment of the third respondent as substantive Chief
• Whether the court should exercise its discretion to hear a moot case in the interests of justice
• Whether the President should have been cited as a party where the appointment process had been completed

The application was struck off the roll with no order as to costs. Specifically: (1) The application for condonation and removal of the bar was dismissed; (2) The first, second and third respondents' opposing affidavit filed on 19 March 2025 was struck out; (3) The opposing papers filed by the third respondent on 16 June 2025 were struck out; (4) The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the matter on the principle of mootness.

The binding legal principles are: (1) A valid opposition under Rule 59(7) of the High Court Rules, 2021 requires both a notice of opposition and opposing affidavit filed together - filing only an opposing affidavit renders the opposition a nullity; (2) The IECMS electronic filing system does not generate or substitute for a properly filed notice of opposition; (3) Failure to comply with the peremptory requirements of Rule 59(8) to serve opposition within seven days and file a certificate of service within 48 hours results in automatic bar under Rule 59(9); (4) Once barred under Rule 59(9), a party has no right of audience except to apply for removal of the bar, and cannot file further pleadings unless the bar is removed; (5) An application for removal of bar requires: (a) reasonable explanation for delay/default; (b) demonstration that application is bona fide; (c) no reckless or intentional disregard of rules; (d) prospects of success on the merits; and (e) no uncompensable prejudice to the other party; (6) After an answering affidavit has been filed, no further affidavits may be filed without leave of court under Rule 59(12); (7) Where the President has appointed a substantive chief under section 3 of the Traditional Leaders Act and section 283 of the Constitution, a challenge only to the nomination process without citing the President or seeking to set aside the appointment is moot, as nomination is part of the appointment process, not a standalone event; (8) A matter is moot when events outside the record have terminated the live controversy between parties; (9) Even where a matter is moot, the court retains discretion to hear it if in the interests of justice, considering factors including practical effect, importance of issues, complexity, and fullness of argument.

The court made several important observations: (1) The advent of the IECMS electronic filing system has brought ease to filing court documents, but this does not diminish or modify the substantive requirements of the court rules - parties must still comply with all rule requirements including filing notices of opposition; (2) Legal practitioners cannot lead evidence from the bar - allegations of technical difficulties must be properly evidenced; (3) While section 283 of the Constitution does not oust the High Court's review jurisdiction over traditional leader appointments, what is reviewable is not how the President exercises discretion but whether those who formulate advice to the President (the Minister and other administrative authorities) acted on sound principle; (4) Rules of court exist to regulate the court process and are essential for proper administration of justice - parties who pay little regard to court rules may find themselves non-suited; (5) Diligent legal practitioners should not wait until the last day to file papers; (6) Applicants seeking to challenge traditional leader appointments must understand the appointment as a process culminating in the President's act, not as discrete severable events; (7) Courts will not readily accept invitations to adjudicate issues where the decision sought will have no practical effect; (8) The adversarial system contemplates parties having interest in the outcome where determination would have practical and tangible consequences; (9) Allowing matters to proceed without proper compliance with rules would waste valuable judicial resources which should be directed to worthy causes.

This case is significant for several aspects of Zimbabwean procedural and administrative law: (1) It confirms the strict application of Rule 59 requirements for opposition in court applications, particularly under the new IECMS electronic filing system, clarifying that system-generated notices do not substitute for properly filed notices of opposition; (2) It reinforces that peremptory time limits and procedural requirements lead to automatic bar under Rule 59(9), and that applications for removal of bar require full compliance with established requirements including reasonable explanations, prospects of success, and absence of prejudice; (3) It establishes important principles regarding challenges to traditional leadership appointments, holding that once the President has exercised the appointment power under section 3 of the Traditional Leaders Act and section 283 of the Constitution, challenges to the nomination process alone are moot - the President must be cited and the appointment itself challenged; (4) It applies the doctrine of mootness in the constitutional and administrative law context, emphasizing that courts will not determine academic disputes unless interests of justice require it; (5) It demonstrates judicial reluctance to engage in piecemeal litigation of interconnected administrative processes. The case reinforces procedural discipline while protecting the integrity of constitutional appointments of traditional leaders.