The applicant and respondent were previously married with three minor children. They divorced on 24 November 2005 in accordance with a consent paper governing custody, access, and maintenance. The consent agreement provided that the respondent would not pay maintenance or school fees as he was unemployed with no savings. After the divorce, the respondent exercised access rights by taking the children on expensive foreign holidays - a four-week trip to London, Euro Disney Paris, and skiing in Europe during December holidays, and a three-week trip to London and Euro Disney in April. The applicant argued this luxurious lifestyle contradicted the respondent's claim of indigence and that he was evading maintenance obligations. The respondent maintained he was unemployed, had no income or savings, and was living with a friend (Richard Cook, a school headmaster) who supported him financially. He claimed the holidays were funded by money borrowed from friends.
The application was dismissed with no order as to costs. The court declined to grant any of the relief sought by the applicant, including payment of school fees, rental, medical aid, cell phone charges, fuel costs, or restriction of access rights to Zimbabwe.
A court cannot order maintenance against a respondent based solely on suspicion or circumstantial evidence of means when the applicant has previously accepted that the respondent was unemployed and without savings, and there is insufficient proof on the papers to establish actual income or assets. The court will not order maintenance on the basis that a party should borrow money from friends to meet obligations. A custodian parent has the discretion to determine where and how access by the non-custodian parent should be exercised, particularly where the consent order does not specify that access must occur outside the country. A court will not restrict access rights on the basis of alleged parental alienation syndrome without concrete evidence of active alienation conduct and expert evidence (such as from child psychologists) demonstrating actual harm to the children.
The court observed that the applicant, as custodian parent, is empowered to make day-to-day decisions on behalf of the minor children and has the right to regulate the children's lives, including determining with whom they should associate, how they should be educated, what religious training they should receive, and how their health should be cared for. The court noted that if the applicant considered it not in the best interests of the children for the respondent to exercise access outside Zimbabwe, she could decline to allow such access at her discretion. The court also made an implicit observation about costs, noting that the respondent's default at the hearing suggested he did not wish to claim costs for opposing the application.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean family law for clarifying the evidentiary burden required to establish means for maintenance purposes, particularly where a party claims indigence while simultaneously exhibiting an apparently affluent lifestyle. It also reinforces the broad discretionary powers of the custodian parent in regulating access arrangements and the high threshold required before a court will interfere with access rights on allegations of parental alienation. The case demonstrates that mere assumption of potential harm, without expert evidence, is insufficient to restrict a non-custodian parent's access rights.