Jefeat Chaganda v National Prosecuting Authority and Officer in Charge Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services Khami

The applicant was charged with obstructing the course of justice under CRB 108/22, along with previous proceedings under CRB 118/18 and CRB 112/20. Following a trial that was ordered de novo on 30 July 2025 due to the absence of a second assessor (pursuant to section 8 of the High Court Act), the applicant sought habeas corpus relief under section 50(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, arguing that his continued detention was unlawful for want of a valid remand order, warrant of committal, or other statutory basis under section 70(1) of the Prisons and Correctional Services Act. The applicant contended that proceedings under CRB 118/18 and CRB 108/22 had been quashed and set aside, rendering any detention orders void. He also claimed he had never been charged under CRB 112/20. The applicant had a history of absconding from court proceedings, including failing to appear on 27 June 2023, which resulted in a warrant of arrest and a default inquiry. Previous bail had been revoked due to abscondment. The applicant refused to sign the new indictment prepared for trial on 3 November 2025.

• Whether the quashing of criminal proceedings under section 8 of the High Court Act extinguishes the charges against an accused person
• Whether an accused person ordered to be retried de novo must be released from custody in the absence of a fresh remand order
• Whether section 70 of the Correctional Service Act applies to detention pending trial ordered de novo
• Whether the applicant was entitled to habeas corpus relief under section 50(7) of the Constitution
• Whether the applicant's history of abscondment constituted compelling reasons to deny bail under section 117(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act

1. The application for habeas corpus was dismissed. 2. The first respondent (National Prosecuting Authority) was ordered to indict the applicant again for 3 November 2025.

When a criminal trial is ordered de novo pursuant to section 8(3)(b) of the High Court Act due to procedural irregularity, the charges against the accused are not extinguished but remain extant. The statutory language "shall remain in custody" is peremptory and mandates continued detention unless the accused is granted bail through a separate application under Part IX of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. An accused person's refusal to sign a new indictment does not invalidate the indictment or terminate the prosecution. Where an accused has a demonstrated history of abscondment and previous bail revocations, this constitutes compelling reasons under section 117(2) of the CPEA to deny bail based on the likelihood that the accused will not stand trial.

The court observed that the applicant's submission that the default inquiry was still pending and therefore there was no case against him was misleading, noting that as long as a matter has not been determined, it remains an outstanding case before the court. Although not directly before the court in the application, the court discussed the framework under section 117(2) of the CPEA for denying bail, including considerations of public safety, likelihood of abscondment, witness intimidation, and jeopardizing the criminal justice system. The court also noted that the State's reliance on the order from CRB 118/18 was contested by the applicant on the basis that those proceedings had been quashed, though the court did not need to definitively resolve this point given its findings on CRB 108/22.

This case clarifies the scope and application of section 8(3)(b) of the High Court Act in Zimbabwe, confirming that when criminal proceedings are ordered de novo due to procedural irregularities (such as assessor incapacity), the charges against the accused remain valid and extant. The judgment reinforces that such a procedural reset does not require the release of an accused person from custody, and that continued detention is mandatory unless bail is granted through the proper statutory process. The case also demonstrates the interplay between habeas corpus applications under the Constitution and the statutory framework governing bail and detention, clarifying that a history of abscondment constitutes compelling reasons to deny bail under section 117(2) of the CPEA. It confirms that reliance on section 70 of the Correctional Service Act is inappropriate where detention is authorized by the peremptory provisions of the High Court Act pending retrial.