The parties married out of community of property on 21 September 1996 and had one child, Adrien Andisa Manyathela, born 14 July 1997. The plaintiff, a former train driver at NRZ who retired on medical grounds in 2005 after 24 years of service, was 52 years old and running a retail shop. The defendant, aged 42, was a former sales lady running a tailoring business and flea market stand. After 13 years of marriage, the plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings in June 2009, stating that the defendant had obtained a protection order against him after he assaulted her. All issues were resolved except the distribution of the matrimonial home at No. 6 Blasson Avenue North End, Bulawayo. The plaintiff had been allocated the house as rented NRZ accommodation in 1996 after divorcing his first wife. NRZ initially sought to evict him as it was for married employees, but he married the defendant and was allowed to remain. In 1999, NRZ offered houses to sitting tenants at concessionary prices. The plaintiff signed a memorandum of understanding in July 1999, with deductions from his salary towards purchase. He paid off the house and signed a sale agreement on 15 August 2001. The house was transferred to a company, J. Manyathela Retailers (Pvt) Ltd, which he formed with his brothers in 2001, on 4 July 2002. The defendant was made a director and issued 5,000 shares (25%) in March 2007 after a serious assault incident. The plaintiff held 75% shares after removing his brothers.
1. Decree of divorce granted. 2. Custody of minor child awarded to defendant with plaintiff having reasonable access. 3. Plaintiff to pay maintenance per existing maintenance order (Case M29/2010). 4. Plaintiff awarded specific movable property and Nissan Hardbody vehicle. 5. Defendant awarded specific movable property and Toyota Camry vehicle. 6(a). Matrimonial home to be valued by agreed estate agents and plaintiff to pay defendant 50% of market value within 3 months. 6(b). If plaintiff fails to pay, house to be sold and proceeds shared equally. 7. Each party to bear own costs.
Where a matrimonial home is registered in the name of a company that serves as the alter ego of one spouse and was created solely to facilitate loan access or exclude the other spouse, the court may lift the corporate veil and treat the property as part of the matrimonial estate. Under sections 7(2) and 7(4) of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:13], the court has wide discretion to distribute matrimonial property fairly between parties, having regard to all relevant factors including both direct and indirect contributions by each spouse. A working spouse who contributes financially to family expenses while the other spouse's income is dedicated to purchasing the matrimonial home has made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of that property, entitling them to an equal share where circumstances warrant it. The court will consider the conduct of parties, including domestic violence, in determining what constitutes a fair distribution of matrimonial property.
The court observed that the plaintiff's suggestion that he should receive 75% of the house to share with his adult children (aged 25 and 21) from a previous marriage, while the defendant should take 25% to purchase a small house in high-density suburbs, indicated he had never regarded the defendant as an equal in their relationship and was "simply arrogant and selfish." The court also noted that the plaintiff did not deal with the court with candour, as he tried to introduce the issue of his brothers and the company to cloud what was otherwise a straightforward matrimonial dispute. The court commented that it appeared the plaintiff filed for divorce because he was unhappy with being prevented from perpetuating further assaults on the defendant after she obtained a protection order.
This Zimbabwean High Court case is significant for its application of principles regarding: (1) lifting the corporate veil in matrimonial property disputes where a company is used as an alter ego to exclude a spouse from property rights; (2) recognition of both direct and indirect contributions by spouses to matrimonial property; (3) rejection of attempts to diminish a working spouse's contributions by portraying them as a "mere housewife"; (4) consideration of domestic violence and abuse as a factor in the breakdown of marriage and property distribution; and (5) application of the wide judicial discretion under section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act to achieve fair distribution between parties. The case demonstrates that courts will look beyond corporate structures to the substance of matrimonial property acquisition and will not allow technical legal arrangements to defeat a spouse's legitimate entitlement to matrimonial assets.