Ivyn Gabriel Mbatha v Clothing Industry Pension Fund and Mercy Dare N.O

The applicant was employed as a Senior Pension Officer by the 1st respondent (Clothing Industry Pension Fund). In December 2008, he complained to a Labour Officer about unfair labour practices, including unlawful transfer and unilateral withdrawal of contractual benefits (medical aid, parking discs, vehicle repairs and fuel). On 8 April 2009, a ruling was granted in his favour directing reinstatement of benefits. The 1st respondent undertook to comply on 16 July 2009 but failed to do so fully. The matter was referred to the 2nd respondent (a labour officer), and after failed conciliation, a draft ruling was handed down in the applicant's favour on 21 December 2021. On 17 June 2022, the 2nd respondent filed an application for confirmation in the Labour Court (LCH519/22). The 1st respondent raised prescription, which was dismissed. Appeals went to the Supreme Court (SC179/23, dismissed by SC47/24) and an application for Constitutional Court access (CCZ 34/24) was withdrawn. The applicant then brought this application under section 128 of the Labour Act seeking registration of the labour officer's judgment. The 1st respondent raised a preliminary objection that the applicant lacked locus standi to bring the application.

• Whether the applicant has locus standi to bring an application for registration of a labour officer's judgment under section 128 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]
• Whether section 128, which is silent on who may register a labour officer's ruling, should be interpreted to permit registration by the winning party or only by the labour officer
• The proper interpretation of section 128 of the Labour Act in the absence of express statutory authority designating who may initiate registration proceedings

1. The applicant has locus standi. 2. The preliminary point raised by the respondent that the applicant has no locus standi is dismissed with costs.

Where section 128 of the Labour Act is silent as to who may bring an application for registration of a labour officer's ruling, the common law principles of locus standi apply. A party who has a direct and substantial interest in the right which is the subject matter of the ruling and the relief sought has locus standi to bring an application for registration. The winning party in labour proceedings has the requisite direct and substantial interest to seek registration of a ruling granted in their favour. In the absence of clear statutory authority, a labour officer cannot unilaterally initiate the registration process. The legislative intention, interpreted purposively, is to allow the winning party to register the ruling, consistent with the procedure for registration of arbitration awards. Statutory interpretation must be purposive and favour access to justice, and repealed provisions should not be used to restrict rights under new legislation where the new provisions are silent on procedural matters.

The court observed that the 1st respondent's reliance on the Kadoma Textiles case was misplaced as that case dealt with section 92 (registration of confirmed rulings) rather than section 128 (transitional provisions for draft rulings). The court noted that without clear statutory authority in section 128, it must apply a purposive interpretation that favours the applicant, and that the Labour Officer cannot start the registration process in the absence of express statutory authorization to do so.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law as it clarifies who has standing to bring applications for registration of labour officers' rulings under the transitional provisions of section 128 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. The judgment establishes that where a statute is silent on procedural matters, common law principles of locus standi apply, and the winning party in labour proceedings has the right to seek registration of rulings in their favour. The case also provides guidance on purposive statutory interpretation in labour matters, particularly in relation to transitional provisions dealing with draft rulings that were not registered under the previous statutory regime. It affirms that statutory interpretation should favour access to justice for employees seeking to enforce labour rights, and that repealed provisions should not be used to restrict rights under new legislation where the new provisions are silent.