Innocent Manjoro v The State

The appellant, Innocent Manjoro, was the manager of a grinding mill owned by his mother at Muparutsa Business Centre, Honde Valley. In July 2020, he experienced an electrical fault and contacted ZESA. A ZESA employee (his co-accused Stanley Ndongwe) advised him to hire an electrician. The appellant hired an electrician named "Spider" to repair the fault. On 28 August 2020, ZESA inspectors discovered that electricity was being diverted and not passing through the meter - the terminals of the breaker had been removed and connected directly to the grinding mill. The diversion occurred at a ZESA substation 100m away from the grinding mill. The appellant denied knowledge of the abstraction, blamed the electrician Spider, and claimed he had been purchasing electricity tokens. Spider was never called as a witness, nor was he prosecuted.

• Whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant abstracted or diverted electricity current contrary to s 60A(1)(a) of the Electricity Act
• Whether the court a quo erred in placing the onus on the appellant to prove he was purchasing electricity tokens
• Whether the court a quo misdirected itself on the facts in concluding the appellant instructed Spider to abstract electricity
• Whether the sentence imposed was disturbingly severe

The appeal against conviction was upheld. The conviction was quashed and set aside. The appellant was found not guilty and acquitted on both the main and alternative charges. The appeal against sentence fell away.

In criminal prosecutions under the Electricity Act, the State bears the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the offence including mens rea, actus reus and unlawfulness. A court cannot reverse this onus by requiring an accused to prove innocence (such as proving purchase of electricity tokens). A trial court commits a misdirection when it makes adverse findings against an accused based on facts not supported by evidence on record. Where the State fails to call a key witness who could clarify the accused's knowledge and involvement, and the only inference is not necessarily inculpatory, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. The mere fact that an accused was a manager of premises where electricity abstraction occurred does not establish knowledge or participation in the abstraction.

The court observed that the Magistrate Court did not pronounce its verdict on the alternative charge of unlawful use of electricity. The court also noted that the amount of prejudice suffered by ZESA was not established by the State and the facts were scanty. The court remarked that a trial court should not make conclusions or inferences from facts not established by tangible evidence, and that doing so constitutes a misdirection. The court noted that no inspection in loco was conducted, which would have been relevant to the Magistrate's finding that the diversion was easily visible.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal law as it reinforces fundamental principles of criminal procedure: (1) the onus always rests on the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be reversed to require an accused to prove innocence; (2) a trial court cannot make adverse findings against an accused based on facts not supported by evidence on record; (3) where a key witness (in this case Spider, the electrician) is not called by the State and could provide exculpatory evidence, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused; (4) mere proximity or management responsibility does not establish knowledge or participation in criminal conduct - the State must prove all elements of the offence including mens rea and actus reus; (5) courts must base inferences on tangible evidence and cannot import their own facts. The case serves as an important reminder of the dangers of conviction based on suspicion rather than proof.