Innocent Gonese and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly N.O. and Others

Eighteen applicants, elected members of Parliament under the MDC-Alliance party for the 2018-2023 parliamentary term, were investigated by a Privileges Committee established by Parliament on 3 December 2019. The Committee was set up following allegations that opposition members showed disrespect to the President by: (a) not rising when the President entered Parliament; (b) walking out during Presidential addresses; and (c) boycotting sessions when the President attended. The Committee's terms of reference directed it to investigate whether this conduct constituted contempt of Parliament. On 7 July 2020, applicants received letters inviting them to appear before the Privileges Committee on 14 July 2020. The applicants filed an urgent application on 14 July 2020 seeking an interdict restraining the respondents from convening hearings before the Privileges Committee pending finalization of a separate matter (HC 2922/20) filed on 12 June 2020, in which other parties challenged the composition and legality of the Privileges Committee. The applicants in the current matter were not parties to HC 2922/20.

• Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with Parliamentary proceedings involving privileges and contempt issues
• Whether the application was urgent
• Whether applicants could seek interim relief predicated on a separate matter (HC 2922/20) to which they were not parties
• Whether the doctrine of separation of powers precluded the court from interfering with internal Parliamentary processes
• Whether domestic remedies within Parliament had to be exhausted before seeking judicial relief

The application was dismissed with costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Under section 16 of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act [Chapter 2:08], Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether conduct of its members constitutes contempt of Parliament, and courts should not interfere with lawful processes conducted under this enabling legislation while internal processes are ongoing; (2) Members of Parliament must exhaust domestic remedies available within Parliament before seeking external judicial remedies regarding parliamentary privilege and contempt matters; (3) An applicant cannot seek provisional or interim relief predicated on or designed to regulate proceedings in a matter to which they are not parties, even if the outcome of that matter may affect their interests; (4) The doctrine of separation of powers requires judicial deference to Parliament's internal processes, subject to the court's power to review whether proper procedures were followed after domestic remedies are exhausted.

CHITAPI J made several non-binding observations: (1) That urgency in every case must be considered against the particular circumstances of each case and is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion; (2) That the nature and national importance of a case may be a strong consideration when determining whether to hear a matter on the urgent roll; (3) That the decision on urgency arises from the papers themselves, and while a respondent may object, there is no onus on the respondent to prove non-urgency - the judge can strike a matter from the urgent roll even before opposing papers are filed; (4) That every reasonable litigant wishes for immediate resolution, but rules of court exist for orderly justice administration; (5) That the court referenced its entitlement to refer to its own records and proceedings, citing Mhungu v Mtindi 1986(2) ZLR 171; (6) An observation that the lack of prosecution of HC 2922/20 and the manner of filing the current application "speaks to the lack of bona fides" of both applications; (7) That the procedural failures in the application "must have been apparent to a discerning legal mind."

This case reinforces important principles regarding the separation of powers and the limits of judicial interference in parliamentary processes in Zimbabwe. It confirms that Parliament has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of parliamentary privilege and contempt under the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act. The case establishes that members of Parliament must exhaust domestic remedies within Parliament before seeking judicial intervention. Most importantly, it clarifies procedural requirements for interim relief applications, holding that applicants cannot seek provisional orders to regulate proceedings in matters to which they are not parties, even where the outcome of such matters may affect their interests. The judgment demonstrates judicial deference to parliamentary autonomy while preserving the court's review jurisdiction after internal processes are exhausted.