The applicant sued the respondent (ZETDC) in the Magistrates Court for breach of contract and a delictual claim based on mental suffering. The Magistrate granted absolution from the instance at the close of the applicant's case. The applicant appealed (CIV "A" 457/14) but the appeal was dismissed when he failed to appear. The applicant then applied for rescission of the default judgment in HC 9542/15, but again defaulted by not appearing at the hearing, resulting in dismissal. The applicant explained that on the day of hearing, the matter was moved from Court "M" to Court "O", and by the time he realized this and reached Court "O", his matter had been dismissed. The applicant now seeks rescission of the judgment in HC 2622/16 under Rule 63 of the High Court Rules 1971.
1. The application is dismissed. 2. The applicant is required to seek leave of this court before he can issue any process out of this court. 3. No order as to costs.
To succeed in an application for rescission of default judgment under Rule 63 of the High Court Rules 1971, an applicant must establish good and sufficient cause, which requires: (i) a reasonable explanation for the default; (ii) a bona fide defence to the main claim (or in this case, bona fide prospects of success in the underlying application); and (iii) that the application for rescission itself be bona fide. All three requirements must be satisfied. The High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to prevent vexatious litigation as an abuse of its own process, and may require a litigant to seek leave before issuing any further process where the litigant has demonstrated a pattern of filing vexatious, prolix, and incomprehensible pleadings that waste judicial resources and harass other parties.
The court made extensive observations about the need for concise and clear pleadings, noting that it had to "plough through a 100 paged record with endless repetitions and unnecessary material" in what was actually a very simple matter. The court emphasized that pleadings should be concise, identify the branch of law under which the claim is made, and should not contain evidence. The court quoted approvingly from Fungai Nhau v Memory Kipe noting it is "a serious dereliction of duty for legal practitioners to continue presenting such offensive pleadings," and extended this principle to self-represented litigants. The court observed that while the power to control vexatious litigation "must be exercised with very great caution and only in a clear case as the courts of law are open to all," this was an appropriate case for such intervention. The court noted it was "fortuitous that the respondent in this matter did not oppose the application," implying concern about the costs and harassment such vexatious pleadings impose on opposing parties.
This case is significant for establishing that Zimbabwean courts will exercise their inherent jurisdiction to control vexatious litigation by imposing leave requirements on litigants who repeatedly file prolix, incomprehensible, and abusive pleadings. It reinforces the principles governing rescission of default judgments under Rule 63 and emphasizes the requirement for concise, clear pleadings. The case demonstrates that even self-represented litigants (self-actors) are held to standards of proper pleading and can be restricted from filing further processes without leave of court when they abuse the court's process. It also clarifies that the proper remedy for a dismissed appeal due to non-appearance is reinstatement of the appeal, not rescission of judgment.