Hwange Colliery Company Limited v The Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police N.O and Others

On 29 January 2018, a large number of demonstrators, including women and children, overwhelmed the applicant's security and invaded Hwange Colliery Company's property at Number 1 Coronation Drive, Hwange. The demonstrators occupied the premises in protest of the applicant's failure to pay their spouses' salaries for the last five years. The applicant initially made an urgent chamber application under HC1004/18 to compel the police to disperse the demonstrators but withdrew it. The applicant then filed two further urgent applications - one at the Bulawayo High Court (which was struck off) and the current application filed on 7 February 2018. The applicant did not initially cite the demonstrating women and children, but they were later joined as fourth and fifth respondents through an oral application, represented by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. A trade union (sixth respondent) whose members are employees of the applicant was also joined by consent.

• Whether the matter qualified for treatment as urgent under Rule 242(2)(b) of the High Court Rules
• Whether the certificate of urgency complied with the requirements set out in Kuvarega v Registrar General 1998 (1) ZLR 188
• Whether the delay between 29 January 2018 (commencement of demonstrations) and 7 February 2018 (filing of application) was adequately explained
• Whether costs should be awarded against the applicant in favour of the joined respondents

The matter was found not to be urgent and was removed from the roll of urgent matters. The applicant was ordered to pay costs of the fourth and fifth respondents. No order as to costs was made in respect of the first, second, and sixth respondents.

A certificate of urgency must comply with Rule 242(2)(b) and the principles in Kuvarega v Registrar General 1998 (1) ZLR 188 by providing substantive independent analysis of why a matter requires urgent treatment, not merely regurgitating the founding affidavit. The certificate must explain any delays between the triggering event and the filing of the application, and must disclose previous applications on the same subject matter. Parties who will be directly affected by the relief sought have a proper basis for joinder even if not originally cited by the applicant. An applicant who seeks urgent relief must clearly demonstrate what remedies were sought and exhausted, and why the court should prioritize the matter over all other pending matters.

The court observed that there appeared to be a difference in approach between what the applicant wanted and what assistance the police were already providing, noting that police were on the ground ensuring peaceful demonstration. The court suggested that the applicant may have wanted 'much more than the assistance being rendered by the police at the present moment' and that this should have been made clear in the papers. The court also commented on the purpose of costs awards being to indemnify a party compelled to initiate or defend proceedings, and distinguished between necessary joinder (fourth and fifth respondents representing demonstrators) and unnecessary joinder (sixth respondent trade union) for purposes of costs orders.

This case reinforces the strict requirements for urgent applications in Zimbabwean courts, particularly the need for a certificate of urgency to provide substantive independent analysis rather than mere repetition of the founding affidavit. It clarifies that applicants must adequately explain delays and previous failed attempts at relief when seeking urgent treatment. The case also demonstrates judicial recognition of the right to peaceful protest and the need for proper joinder of parties who would be directly affected by relief sought, even if not originally cited. It illustrates the balance between property rights and constitutional rights to demonstrate, and the court's reluctance to interfere with peaceful demonstrations where police are already managing the situation.