Hermysh Katsande and Others v Sheriff of the High Court and Others

The second applicant, Francis Kapula, was subject to an eviction order issued under case HC7211/20 directing his removal from 31 stands. The second applicant denied ownership of these stands. The remaining applicants (1st and 3rd to 7th) were not parties to HC7211/20 and only became aware of the eviction order on 10 August 2025 when informed by police that they would be evicted from their homes pursuant to the court order. They claimed the stands belonged to them, not to the second applicant. The applicants brought an urgent chamber application for a stay of execution pending determination of an application for rescission of default judgment under HC7211/20. The third and fourth respondents argued that the second applicant had consistently claimed ownership of the stands (as confirmed by a November 2022 order by late Justice TAGU), and that the other applicants had purchased stands from the second applicant who now denied ownership. A notice of ejectment had been served on applicants on 17 June 2025.

• Whether the matter was genuinely urgent to justify treatment as an urgent chamber application
• Whether the urgency was self-created due to delay in bringing the application
• Whether applicants provided reasonable explanation for delay between notice of ejectment (17 June 2025) and filing of urgent application

1. The application is not urgent and is struck off from the roll of urgent matters. 2. The applicants shall pay the second, third, and fourth respondents' costs at the ordinary scale, jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved.

An urgent application will be struck off the roll where applicants fail to provide a reasonable explanation for delay in bringing the application. Urgency is not established merely by alleging imminent prejudice when the applicants were aware of the matter substantially earlier and failed to act timeously. The principle from Kuvarega v Registrar General applies: urgency stemming from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline draws near is not the type of urgency contemplated by the court rules, and any certificate of urgency or supporting affidavit must contain an explanation for non-timeous action where there has been delay.

The court noted concerns about the credibility of the applicants' case, including: (1) the inconsistency between the second applicant's current denial of ownership and his previous consistent claims to ownership as evidenced by the November 2022 order of late Justice TAGU; (2) the claim by other applicants that they purchased stands from the second applicant who now denies ever owning them; (3) the lack of a supporting affidavit from legal practitioners who allegedly communicated with police on 10 August 2025; and (4) the respondents' submission that the alleged notification of 10 August 2025 appeared to be a misrepresentation intended to mislead the court. While these issues were not determinative, they suggested potential fabrication of facts to create a false sense of urgency.

This case reinforces the strict approach taken by Zimbabwean courts to urgency in chamber applications. It emphasizes that applicants cannot create urgency through their own delay or inaction, and that courts will require credible explanations for any delay between the triggering event and the filing of an urgent application. The judgment demonstrates that courts will scrutinize claims of urgency and will dismiss applications where urgency is self-created, particularly where documentary evidence contradicts the applicants' version of events.