Harlequin Luxaire Limited v Mberikunashe Masvimbo & 14 Ors

The appellant employed the respondents on contracts without limit of time at its various branches. On 10 and 11 June 2015, citing macro-economic challenges and viability constraints, the appellant wrote to the respondents terminating their employment contracts on three months' notice and simultaneously offering new contracts based on productivity-based remuneration. The respondents, through their legal practitioners, challenged this action as unlawful. On 4 September 2015, the respondents approached the High Court seeking a declaratory order that the termination or variation of their employment contracts was unlawful. The High Court granted the declaratur and ordered reinstatement without loss of salary and benefits, or damages in the alternative, together with costs. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. After judgment was reserved, the Supreme Court raised mero motu a point in limine regarding whether the High Court could properly issue a declaratur in a purely labour matter given the exclusive jurisdiction provisions in the Labour Act.

• Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratur in a purely labour matter in light of s 2A(3) and s 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 26:01]
• Whether s 89(6) of the Labour Act, which gives the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction over labour matters in the first instance, ousts the High Court's jurisdiction under s 14 of the High Court Act to grant declaratory orders in labour matters
• Whether s 171(1) of the Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction on the High Court over all civil and criminal matters, overrides the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction in labour matters
• The interaction between the Constitution's provisions for the High Court (s 171) and specialized courts like the Labour Court (s 172)
• Whether the termination of employment contracts constituted unlawful dismissal requiring compliance with retrenchment procedures

The appeal succeeded with each party bearing its own costs. The Supreme Court, exercising its review powers in terms of s 25(2) of the Supreme Court Act [Chapter 7:13], set aside the decision of the court a quo and substituted it with an order striking the application off the roll with costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) The Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine all labour and employment matters by virtue of s 89(6) of the Labour Act and s 172(2) of the Constitution. (2) Section 171 of the Constitution (conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court) and s 172 (establishing specialized courts) are in pari materia and must be construed together; the Constitution permits the establishment of specialized courts with jurisdiction defined by Acts of Parliament without making such jurisdiction subject to the High Court's general jurisdiction. (3) Section 2A(3) of the Labour Act provides that the Labour Act prevails over any enactment inconsistent with it, thus limiting the High Court's power under s 14 of the High Court Act to issue declaraturs in purely labour matters. (4) The Labour Court has the power to issue declaratory orders in the course of determining labour disputes. (5) The High Court must decline jurisdiction when seized with a purely labour matter that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court.

The Court made several notable obiter observations: (1) It noted that extending the High Court's jurisdiction to all matters handled by specialized courts (such as military tribunals, tax courts, and customary law courts) would be absurd and would bog down the High Court in matters over which it may have very little expertise or petty matters that should not ordinarily detain the court. (2) The Court observed that the Labour Court routinely issues declaratory orders in its daily operations, holding for example that an employee has been wrongfully dismissed or that certain actions constitute unfair labour practices, and then proceeds to grant consequential relief. (3) The Court emphasized that it would have taken very clear and explicit provisions in the new Constitution to oust the legal regime established and solidified before its enactment regarding the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction. (4) The judgment noted that the controversy over jurisdiction had led to "an unhappy state of law" which had now been put to rest by the Nhari v Mugabe decision.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence as it reinforces and clarifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court over labour and employment matters in the first instance, following the landmark decision in Nhari v Mugabe. It settles the post-2013 Constitution controversy about whether the High Court's original jurisdiction under s 171 of the Constitution extends to all labour matters or whether the Labour Court's specialized jurisdiction under s 172 and s 89(6) of the Labour Act prevails. The judgment clarifies that specialized courts established under the Constitution have exclusive jurisdiction in their designated areas, and this does not conflict with the High Court's general original jurisdiction. The case also confirms that the Labour Court has the power to issue declaratory orders in labour matters, dispelling the notion that only the High Court can grant such relief. This decision is important for understanding the hierarchy and distribution of jurisdiction among Zimbabwean courts and prevents forum shopping in labour disputes.