The appellant church had split into two factions. The respondents belonged to one faction while the deponent and supporters formed the opposite faction. Both factions fought over the right to access a shrine in Rusape where the church founder's remains are interred. The appellant was scheduled to hold its annual synod at the shrine from 23 September to 4 October 2017. The respondents indicated their intention to visit the shrine during the same period. Fearing violence based on previous clashes, the appellant approached the High Court on 18 September 2017 seeking an urgent interim interdict to prevent the respondents from entering the shrine pending determination of rescission proceedings. The respondents opposed the application, relying on a default judgment dated 27 July 2017 that declared their right to worship at the shrine without disturbance. The High Court conducted an inspection in loco, found that the appellant had not established the requirements for a temporary interdict, but instead of dismissing the application, granted an elaborate order allowing both factions to access the shrine at different times.
The appeal was allowed with costs. The decision of the High Court was set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the application with costs.
A court that has determined a dispositive issue against an applicant must end its inquiry at that point and may not proceed to grant relief to the respondent in the absence of a counter-application. A respondent who has not filed a counter-application is only entitled to a dismissal of the application with costs, not to substantive relief. Once a court finds that an applicant has not established the requirements for the relief sought (such as the requirements for an interim interdict), this disposes of the matter and the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed further or to grant alternative relief not prayed for by the parties.
Makarau JA noted that the appellant had sought the same relief in both the interim and final orders, an issue discussed in other authorities, but found it unnecessary to address this point given the decision reached. The Court also noted without deciding that the use of an inspection in loco in application proceedings was itself "a contentious manner of proceeding" but declined to make a pronouncement on this issue as it was not necessary for the judgment. The Court acknowledged that the situation would have been "significantly" different if the order had been granted with the consent of the parties, but noted that the judgment did not indicate such consent despite stating the court had "engaged" the parties.
This case reinforces fundamental principles of civil procedure in Zimbabwe (and by analogy in South African law given the shared common law heritage): (1) Courts must confine themselves to deciding only what is necessary to resolve the dispute before them; (2) Once a dispositive issue has been determined, the court's inquiry must end; (3) A respondent in application proceedings who has not filed a counter-application cannot be granted substantive relief beyond dismissal of the application; and (4) A court's discretion to fashion appropriate relief does not extend to granting relief to parties who have not prayed for it through proper procedure. The case serves as an important reminder of the limits of judicial discretion and the need to adhere to procedural requirements even in emotionally charged disputes where the court may be inclined to craft practical solutions.