The applicant filed an urgent application seeking an order to compel the City of Harare to release his motor vehicle (a commuter omnibus) which was impounded on 12 January 2015. The application was filed on 28 January 2015, approximately two weeks after the impounding. The applicant alleged his vehicle was impounded by Epah Muguti, an alleged bogus police officer. The respondent disputed this, stating the vehicle was impounded by Constable Moyo. A state outline revealed that on 19 January 2015, the applicant had attended Harare Central Stores intending to pay a fine for his impounded vehicle, but then saw Epah Muguti being arrested for impersonation in relation to another vehicle and subsequently claimed Muguti was responsible for impounding his vehicle. The applicant claimed his livelihood depended on the vehicle and that he had no means to pay for its release.
1. The applicant's application is removed from the roll. 2. If the applicant intends to pursue this application, he must set it down for hearing on the opposed roll within 30 days of the granting of this order, having already filed his answering affidavit. 3. The applicant shall pay the respondent's costs.
A matter cannot be treated as urgent where the applicant has alternative remedies available to obtain the relief sought. The urgent chamber application procedure is reserved for cases that cannot wait and where there is no other way to avoid impending harm. An applicant who delays for two weeks after the triggering event and who abandons available alternative remedies (such as paying prescribed fines) cannot establish urgency. The existence of ordinary remedies through which an applicant can obtain relief defeats the urgency of an application.
The court observed that the legal position on whether a legal practitioner may certify urgency for a case being handled by their own law firm is not settled, with conflicting judgments from the High Court on this issue. The court stated it would be wrong to penalize an applicant on an issue where judges hold divergent views. The court also made observations about the respondent's allegations that certain police officers were 'notorious' for seeking release of motor vehicles through allegations of impersonation, suggesting this may be a pattern of conduct to avoid paying legitimate fines, though this was not determinative of the case.
This case provides guidance on the requirements for urgent applications in Zimbabwe, particularly emphasizing that the existence of alternative remedies will defeat urgency. It also illustrates the principle that applicants must treat their own cases with urgency and cannot rely on self-created delays. The judgment contributes to jurisprudence on when cases deserve to 'jump the queue' through the urgent application procedure. Additionally, the court's acknowledgment of conflicting precedents on legal practitioners certifying urgency for their own firm's cases highlights an area of procedural law requiring clarification.