The appellant, a Zimbabwe Republic Police officer, was charged with theft of 20 litres of diesel from his workplace in Mutoko. An audit on 18 September 2000 revealed a shortfall of 40 litres of diesel. On 19 September 2000, the appellant was found in possession of a 20 litre container full of liquid. The appellant initially told Inspector Phiri and in his Warned and Cautioned statement (recorded on 29 September 2000) that the container contained diesel received from one Panya Chigayo from Murewa. A witness, Mr Mlambo, testified that he saw the appellant leave with an empty container, go to the diesel shed, fill it with diesel and return to his house. Another police officer, Tafira, testified that the appellant told him the container had diesel which he intended to sell. Panya Chigayo testified that the appellant had telephoned him requesting that he tell police he had supplied the diesel, but Panya refused and denied ever supplying diesel to the appellant. At trial, the appellant changed his defence and claimed the container contained paraffin, not diesel. The Magistrate's Court convicted him of theft and sentenced him to a fine of $2,000 or 6 months' imprisonment in default, plus 6 months' imprisonment suspended on conditions. The High Court dismissed his appeal against conviction.
The appeal was dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrate's Court, as upheld by the High Court, were confirmed.
Where an accused person, particularly a police officer familiar with legal procedures, consents to the admission of their extra-curial statement and confirms it without objection, the statement is properly admitted in evidence. In theft cases, circumstantial evidence including credible eyewitness testimony, the accused's initial admissions, possession of stolen property without innocent explanation, and evidence of attempts to fabricate an alibi, can collectively constitute overwhelming evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction can be sustained even if one piece of evidence might be questionable, provided there is sufficient independent evidence to support the conviction.
The court observed that it was implausible that anyone would force someone to make an exculpatory statement, addressing the suggestion of undue influence. The court also commented on the strategic nature of the appellant's changing defence, noting that he had 'banked on co-operation from Panya and in anticipation of that co-operation' made statements about receiving diesel from Panya, only changing his story when that cooperation was not forthcoming. Chidyausiku CJ's characterization of the submission regarding the statement's admissibility as 'ridiculous' reflected the court's view on appeals lacking merit where an accused consents to evidence and later attempts to challenge it on appeal.
This case illustrates the Zimbabwean courts' approach to the admissibility of extra-curial statements where the accused consents to admission, and demonstrates principles regarding sufficiency of evidence in theft cases. It shows that where an accused changes their defence after an anticipated alibi witness refuses to cooperate, and where there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence including credible eyewitness testimony and the accused's own admissions, a conviction can be sustained. The case also confirms that even if some evidence (such as a confession) might be improperly admitted, a conviction can stand if there is sufficient other evidence independent of that disputed evidence.