Global Parentage Services (Pvt) Ltd t/a Global DNA Zimbabwe v Health Professions Authority of Zimbabwe and Medical Laboratory & Clinical Scientists Council of Zimbabwe

The applicant, Global Parentage Services (Pvt) Ltd, trading as Global DNA Zimbabwe, operated a DNA testing collection site. Tinashe Mugabe, a director, became well-known for conducting paternity tests, with results sometimes published through media, YouTube, and a television show. The first respondent (Health Professions Authority of Zimbabwe) instructed the applicant to register as a health institution and employ a medical laboratory scientist, Mercy Chimhundu, who was registered with the second respondent (Medical Laboratory & Clinical Scientists Council of Zimbabwe). Chimhundu resigned citing ethical violations regarding public disclosure of DNA results and controversial press statements attributed to the applicant about paternity patterns. Following her resignation, the second respondent suspended the applicant's registration in September 2021, citing material change under s 104(1)(a) of the Health Professions Act. The applicant challenged this, arguing it was not a health institution under the Act and had only registered to avoid trouble.

• Whether the applicant constituted a 'health institution' as defined in the Health Professions Act [Chapter 27:19]
• Whether the applicant was required to register with the respondents and employ a registered medical laboratory scientist
• Whether the suspension and cancellation of the applicant's registration was lawful
• Whether the applicant's rights to administrative justice and natural justice were violated
• Whether the application for declaratory relief was competent

The court granted the following orders: (i) The applicant is not a health institution as defined by the Health Professions Act [Chapter 27:19]; (ii) The applicant does not fall under the control of the respondents in terms of the Act; (iii) The suspension of the applicant's operations by the respondents in September 2021 is set aside; (iv) The respondents shall pay costs of suit jointly and severally, the one paying, the other to be absolved. The court declined to grant costs on the higher scale of legal practitioner and client as no proper justification was provided.

A DNA sample collection site that merely collects human specimens (such as blood, hair, fingernails, tissue) for DNA testing conducted elsewhere does not constitute a 'health institution' within the meaning of the Health Professions Act [Chapter 27:19]. To qualify as a health institution under the Act, premises must be used by a health practitioner for purposes connected with the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of illness, injury, disability or abnormal physical or mental state. The collection of DNA samples for paternity testing does not fall within these purposes. Administrative bodies may only exercise powers expressly or impliedly granted by statute and cannot compel registration or compliance with requirements that fall outside their statutory mandate. The golden rule of statutory interpretation requires that words be understood in their ordinary and natural meaning, and nothing should be added unless the words are at variance with the clear legislative intent or render a manifest absurdity.

The court observed that while the applicant's activities may require proper regulation, if such regulation exists under other legislation, it was not brought to the court's attention. The Health Professions Act is certainly not the appropriate regulatory framework. The court commented critically on frivolous technical objections raised by counsel, describing them as 'manifestly one of those frivolous objections lawyers are wont to raise as a matter of fashion' or 'as a mandatory ritual'. The court exhorted legal practitioners to 'treat litigation as serious business and should refrain from majoring in pettiness' and emphasized that 'litigation is not a game of wits' but 'a serious legal process that is designed to solve serious social disputes'. The court noted that in the modern era, DNA sampling and testing has become commonplace and easy, with self-testing DNA kits available that enable anyone to collect samples themselves, supporting the conclusion that specialized medical training is not required for sample collection.

This case is significant for its interpretation of the definition of 'health institution' under the Health Professions Act and the limits of regulatory authority over medical-related services. It establishes that DNA sample collection sites that merely collect specimens for testing elsewhere, without engaging in diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of illness, do not fall within the regulatory ambit of health professions authorities. The judgment reinforces the golden rule of statutory interpretation and cautions against stretching statutory definitions beyond their ordinary meaning without clear legislative intent. It also serves as a reminder that administrative bodies must act within their lawful powers and cannot compel compliance with requirements that fall outside their statutory mandate.