On 24 September 2014, the complainant was sleeping on a bench at Centenary Park, Bulawayo, having lost her employment and having nowhere to go. The applicant approached her and offered assistance, allowing her to bathe and wash her clothes in the park. After the applicant was assaulted by a man named Shepherd, he became infuriated, took the complainant's mobile phone and clothes, and led her to a secluded area in the park. The applicant then hit the complainant on the face, demanded sexual intercourse as compensation for the assault he had suffered, removed her clothing, and raped her. The complainant reported the matter to police. The applicant was charged with rape under section 65(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification & Reform) Act, tried before a Magistrate in Bulawayo on 7 May 2015, convicted, and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment with 3 years suspended on conditions of good behaviour. The applicant then sought leave to prosecute an appeal in person against both conviction and sentence.
The application for leave to prosecute an appeal in person was dismissed on 5 April 2017.
In applications for leave to prosecute an appeal in person, the primary consideration is whether the applicant has prospects of success on appeal, not merely whether the appeal is arguable. If the appeal is doomed to fail, the applicant is not entitled to leave to prosecute the appeal in person. The court must examine the record and assess the chances of the appeal succeeding. An appellate court may not re-assess evidence led in the trial court where the trial court has properly considered all evidence, applied the correct legal principles, and reached credible factual findings. The test for granting leave should be based on prospects of success, not on whether an appeal is arguable (applying S v Mutasa 1988 (2) ZLR 4 (SC)).
The court observed that allowing every applicant to prosecute an appeal in person may result in abuse of court process, emphasizing that such applications are not "just there for the taking." The court noted that the applicant's attack on the findings of the trial court were without merit, as the trial Magistrate had carefully assessed the evidence and properly explained the law on how evidence of a single witness ought to be treated in rape cases. The court commented that the applicant merely sought to re-argue his matter and make his own assessment of how the complainant's evidence should have been treated, rather than identifying actual legal or factual errors by the trial court.
This case illustrates the stringent requirements for obtaining leave to prosecute an appeal in person in Zimbabwean criminal matters. It reinforces that such leave is not granted merely because an appeal is arguable, but requires demonstration of actual prospects of success. The judgment also affirms the principles governing appellate review of credibility findings and fact-finding by trial courts, and demonstrates the proper approach to evaluating evidence in sexual offence cases where the complainant is the primary witness. The case serves as a cautionary example that appellate courts will not interfere with well-reasoned trial court judgments absent clear misdirection or error.