Applicant (Gamboge Investments) issued summons under case number HC 1533/16 for recovery of arrear rentals, eviction, cancellation of lease agreement, holdover damages, and water charges against the respondent (Sikhanyiso Shiri), the occupier of Shop 4, Kelsheker Building, 42 Lobengula Street, Bulawayo. The claim arose from repeated breaches of a lease agreement dated 29 January 2011, which was valid for 6 months (1 January 2011 to 30 June 2011). After the lease expired, respondent continued as a statutory tenant but failed to pay rentals. An acknowledgement of debt had been signed by Mr J. Shiri (respondent's husband and co-director). Applicant originally claimed US$57,021.00 for arrear rentals (January 2009 to June 2017) and US$2,020.00 for water charges. Respondent entered appearance to defend, and applicant then applied for summary judgment on the basis that respondent had no bona fide defence.
Judgment entered for the plaintiff (applicant) against the defendant (respondent) for: (1) Payment of US$24,050.00 being arrear rentals for the period 12 June 2014 to 12 June 2017; (2) Payment of US$860.00 being water charges from June 2014 to June 2017; (3) Confirmation of cancellation of the lease agreement for Shop 4, 42 Lobengula Street, Kelsheker Building, Bulawayo; (4) Eviction of defendant and all persons claiming occupation through the defendant from the premises; (5) Interest at the prescribed rate from date of summons to date of full payment; (6) Holdover damages equivalent to monthly rental from June 2017 to date of eviction; (7) Costs of suit.
In a summary judgment application, a respondent cannot raise new defences that were not pleaded in the original plea, as the summary judgment application is not a fresh claim but verification of the claim in the summons. To defeat a summary judgment application, a respondent must outline a defence and material facts with sufficient clarity to show a bona fide defence that, if proved at trial, would constitute a defence to the plaintiff's claim. A defence is not bona fide where it consists of fabrications, concealment of material facts, or contradicts the respondent's own admissions. Under the Prescription Act Chapter 8:11, section 15(d), debts prescribe after three years, but prescription can be interrupted by clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of liability under section 18(1). The prescription period is calculated backwards from the date of issue of summons, taking into account any interruptions by acknowledgement of debt. Where a lease has expired by effluxion of time and a tenant continues in occupation without paying rent, that tenant becomes a statutory tenant and can be evicted for non-payment.
The court observed that the production of a company resolution has been "blown out of proportion" and is not necessary in every case, with each case to be considered on its merits. What is key is that courts must be satisfied that it is the applicant litigating and not an unauthorized person. The court noted that respondent sought to "cloud the court with irrelevant issues thereby circumventing the real issue" of eviction for non-payment. The court commented that respondent's defences appeared to be an afterthought in which she sought to build her case as the matter progressed, which is impermissible. The court also observed that the concepts of statutory tenancy and an oral lease for an indefinite period are mutually exclusive.
This case illustrates the application of summary judgment principles in Zimbabwean law, particularly in landlord-tenant disputes. It demonstrates the court's approach to assessing whether a defence is bona fide or raised merely for dilatory purposes. The judgment is significant for clarifying that new defences cannot be raised in opposition to a summary judgment application if they were not pleaded in the original plea. It also provides guidance on the application of prescription to rental arrears claims and the effect of acknowledgement of debt in interrupting prescription. The case emphasizes the importance of candor with the court and the consequences of attempting to create defences through the concealment of material facts. It also confirms that corporate formalities (such as production of company resolutions) must be assessed on the merits of each case rather than applied rigidly.