Foly Cornishe (Private) Limited and John Humpreys v Shingirayi Tapomwa N.O and Estate Late Misheck Tapomwa and Others

The applicants owned a property (stand number 2558 Glen Lorne Township) which was transferred to them under Deed of Transfer No. 6050/2006. In 2008, the second respondent instituted proceedings in the magistrate's court against the applicants, seeking an order that the property be deemed part of the Estate of the late Misheck Tapomwa. The second respondent obtained a default judgment ordering the transfer of the property. The Registrar of Deeds effected transfer pursuant to the magistrate's court order (Deed of Transfer No. 8361/2008). When the applicants became aware of the transfer through rumours, they approached the High Court seeking to cancel the transfer under section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act. The parties disputed the basis for the original claim, with respondents averring that the property was pledged to the late Tapomwa by the applicants, which the applicants denied.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act to cancel a transfer effected pursuant to a valid court order from the magistrate's court
• Whether section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act can be used to indirectly challenge a court order without following the proper procedures of appeal or review
• Whether there were material disputes of fact that could not be resolved on the papers

The application was dismissed. The applicants were ordered to pay the first and second respondents' costs.

Section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act is intended to regulate administrative functions of the Registrar of Deeds and applies to situations where transfers were done in error, fraud, or without proper authorization. It cannot be used to cancel a transfer that was effected pursuant to a valid court order. Each court is a creature of statute with powers defined by statute, and once a civil court has recognized rights through a judgment, other courts must accept that recognition unless statutory authority exists to overrule it. The High Court can only interfere with decisions of inferior courts through the specific mechanisms provided in the High Court Act: review (section 27) or appeal (section 30). A party cannot use section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act to circumvent these proper procedural requirements and indirectly challenge a magistrate's court order.

The court noted that there appeared to be material disputes of fact between the parties regarding whether the property was pledged to the deceased, whether the deceased was an employee or independent contractor, whether service was properly effected, and other matters. However, Makoni J found it unnecessary to address these disputes given the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. The court also commented that the situations envisaged by the legislature for section 8 applications would include cases like Ellen Ruparanganda v Demetrius John Petrakis & Ors SC 53/05 (where transfer occurred without proper authorization) or cases involving typographical errors in stand numbers, but not cases involving transfers pursuant to court orders.

This case clarifies the scope and proper application of section 8 of the Deeds Registry Act in Zimbabwean law. It establishes that section 8 cannot be used as a backdoor method to challenge transfers effected pursuant to valid court orders, even if those orders were obtained by default. The case reinforces the principle that the hierarchy and jurisdiction of courts must be respected, and that specific statutory procedures (appeal or review) must be followed to challenge lower court decisions. It prevents litigants from circumventing proper appellate procedures by framing challenges as administrative matters under the Deeds Registry Act. The judgment protects the integrity of court orders and the finality of judgments by requiring parties to follow proper procedural avenues rather than seeking collateral attacks through alternative statutory provisions.