In March 2009, the applicant borrowed US$15,000 from the first respondent and surrendered the deed of transfer for her property in Hatfield, Harare, as security. She alleged that she signed an agreement of sale (stating the property was sold for US$10,000), a power of attorney to pass transfer, and a Stamp Duty Declaration form through deceit. She claimed the true agreement was a loan agreement, copies of which were retained by the first respondent. Upon hearing rumors that the first respondent transferred properties given as security, she placed a caveat on the property and approached the court seeking cancellation of the agreement of sale, confirmation of the loan agreement, and return of her deed of transfer. The first respondent denied the loan agreement and insisted only an agreement of sale was concluded, denying any deceit.
1. The application is dismissed. 2. The applicant will bear the respondent's costs.
Where an applicant relies on disputed facts whose proof lies in witness testimony rather than contemporaneous documents, and where the matter will turn on credibility of witnesses, it is incompetent to proceed by way of application procedure. A court should not exercise discretion to condone the wrong procedural approach and refer to trial where: (1) the dispute of fact arises from the applicant's own case rather than the defence; (2) the nature of the case clearly requires viva voce evidence; and (3) no proper cause of action is disclosed in the papers.
The court made important observations on the professional duties of legal practitioners. Makarau JP emphasized that it is the duty of legal practitioners to screen legal issues from client narratives and plead with precision according to law, rather than simply reproducing client stories using imprecise lay language. The court noted that terms like "deceit" have no special legal meaning and could encompass various legal situations (fraud, negligent misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, unilateral mistake). Failure to properly formulate legal causes of action may amount to incompetence on the part of the legal practitioner. The judge also noted that while application procedure is more expedient, it is not always suitable, and numerous authorities have explained when it should not be used.
This case reinforces important principles regarding proper choice of procedure in Zimbabwean civil litigation. It emphasizes that application procedure is inappropriate where material disputes of fact exist that require oral evidence and assessment of witness credibility. The judgment also highlights the professional duty of legal practitioners to properly formulate legal causes of action from client instructions rather than merely reproducing lay language and narratives in court papers.