On 3 July 2016, in the early evening at approximately 18h00, a group of men arrived at the Mall of Africa taxi rank in Midrand in a white VW Polo motor vehicle and fired gunshots at taxi drivers/owners who were waiting to load passengers. Two taxi drivers, Lungisani Hlongwane and Mkhacani Terris Yingwani, were fatally wounded and certified dead at the scene. Three witnesses - Penny Shirinda, Phati Shadrack Mlangeni and Morris Kazamule Machekecheke - ran for cover and survived. The appellant, Zwelithini Maxwell Zondi, was alleged to be amongst the four occupants of the VW Polo and the one who fired the gunshots. The incident occurred in the context of a conflict between the Alexandra, Randburg, Midrand and Sandton Taxi Association (ARMSTA) and the Alexandra Taxi Association (ATA) regarding operating routes. The state witnesses testified that they had first seen the appellant on 27 June 2016 (six days before the shooting) when he arrived at their taxi rank in a Toyota Corolla with ATA stickers and threatened them during a dispute. The appellant pleaded not guilty and raised an alibi defence, stating he was at home with his girlfriend at the time of the incident. He was convicted on two counts of murder, three counts of attempted murder, and unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal to the full court was dismissed, and he subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal for special leave to appeal against conviction.
1. The appeal was upheld. 2. The order of the full court was set aside and replaced with an order that: 'The appeal is upheld and the conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside.' The appellant's convictions on all counts (two counts of murder, three counts of attempted murder, unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition) and all sentences (including life imprisonment) were set aside.
1. Identification evidence must be both credible and reliable. Bald statements by witnesses that an accused was the perpetrator, unexplained, untested and uninvestigated, leave the door wide open for possibilities of mistake and are insufficient to ground a conviction. 2. Where identifying witnesses initially indicate inability to identify the perpetrator to police but later identify the accused, and give changing reasons for their initial failure to disclose identity, this casts serious doubt on the reliability of the identification. 3. The State bears the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no onus on an accused to prove an alibi. 4. Late disclosure of a fact supporting an alibi (such as a vehicle tracking device) is merely one factor to consider in evaluating the weight of alibi evidence. Standing alone, it cannot justify rejection of the alibi or an inference of guilt, particularly where: (a) the fact was never part of the alibi defence itself; (b) the alibi was disclosed timeously; (c) police were informed of the fact but failed to investigate; and (d) no evidence was led to refute the alibi. 5. Once an alibi is raised, it must be accepted unless proven false beyond reasonable doubt. 6. Evidence must be evaluated holistically. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court made strong obiter comments about the poor quality of the investigation and prosecution: "Prosecutors play a critical role in the criminal justice system in response to crime... it is essential that they meticulously ensure that the matters that they bring before courts have been properly investigated and when that has been done, ensure that the evidence is properly presented in court. Sadly, what follows is a model of the very opposite and depicts a picture of a matter that was badly investigated and badly prosecuted." The Court also noted the importance of police conducting full investigations when an alibi is disclosed, particularly when the accused provides information (such as about a tracking device) that could verify or disprove the alibi. The Court observed that the history of differences between the taxi associations made the possibility of collusion to falsely implicate the appellant real, and when considered with all other factors, rendered the evidence unreliable beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reaffirmed the well-established principle that "in search for the truth it is better for a guilty person to go free than for an innocent one to be convicted."
This case is significant in South African criminal law and procedure for several reasons: 1. It reinforces the strict approach courts must take to identification evidence, particularly emphasizing that identification must be both credible AND reliable. 2. It serves as a strong reminder that the burden of proof rests on the State throughout a criminal trial, and that prosecutors and police must properly investigate matters and present evidence meticulously. 3. It clarifies that late disclosure of aspects of an alibi defence (such as the tracking device) cannot, standing alone, justify rejection of the alibi or reversal of the onus of proof onto the accused. 4. It reaffirms the constitutional presumption of innocence and the principle that suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. 5. It illustrates the consequences of inadequate police investigation and poor prosecution - highlighting what the Court described as a matter that was "badly investigated and badly prosecuted." 6. It reinforces the principle established in Musiker v S that once an alibi is raised, it must be accepted unless proven false beyond reasonable doubt. 7. The case demonstrates the application of the principle that it is better for a guilty person to go free than for an innocent one to be convicted.