Monsanto Company held South African Patent No 85/7642 entitled "Prolonged release of biologically active polypeptides". The patent claimed a substantially non-aqueous composition for parenteral administration comprising at least 10% by weight of biologically active bovine somatotropin (a hormone that increases milk production) and, as a continuous phase, a biocompatible oil. The respondent, MDB Animal Health, imported and sold a product called "Hilac", which was an injectable formulation consisting of active bovine somatotropin and Vitamin E (alpha tocopherol acetate, a synthetic oil). The parties agreed that if Vitamin E qualified as an "oil" within the meaning of the patent claims, the respondent would be infringing claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the patent. The court a quo (MacArthur J sitting as Commissioner of Patents) found that Vitamin E was not ordinarily classified as an oil and dismissed the appellant's claim. During trial, witnesses agreed that Vitamin E is ordinarily understood as an oil, and the respondent itself had described Vitamin E as "a high viscous oil" in its application for registration of Hilac. The parties had entered into an agreement making the respondent's counterclaim for revocation of the patent postponed sine die, to be pursued if the appellant succeeded on infringement.
The appeal succeeded with costs, including costs of two counsel. The order of the court below was set aside. It was declared that the defendant, by importing and selling "Hilac", was infringing claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of SA Patent 85/7642. However, given the agreement between parties that the respondent's counterclaim for revocation would proceed if the appellant succeeded on infringement, only a declaratory order was granted, with effective relief (interdict, delivery-up, enquiry into damages) to depend on the outcome of the counterclaim. The defendant was ordered to pay costs of the action relating to the infringement claim, including costs of two counsel and qualifying fees of Dr Palmer.
The binding legal principle established is that in interpreting patent specifications, words must be given their ordinary meaning unless the specification clearly defines them otherwise, and even express definitions must be read in their full context rather than in isolation. Where a patent specification describes a "preferred embodiment" using specific chemical compounds, this does not limit the scope of the claims to only those specific compounds unless there is clear language of limitation. A patent specification should be read as a whole to determine the inventor's intention as conveyed by the language used. When interpreting functional requirements in patent claims (such as the requirement for a "biocompatible oil"), courts should focus on whether the allegedly infringing product performs the required function and has the necessary physical characteristics, rather than insisting on specific chemical compositions, unless the specification clearly limits the scope to particular chemical structures. Technical terms should be given their ordinary meaning in the relevant art or science unless the specification provides its own definition with the intention that a special meaning should apply.
Harms JA made several non-binding observations. He noted Murphy's Law has special significance in patent litigation: "if a word or sentence is capable of two interpretations, the reader will choose the wrong one." He observed that the parties were able to generate a record of nearly 1300 pages despite the narrow point of interpretation. The Court noted it was following the approach in Selero (Pty) Ltd and Another v Chauvier and Another 1984 (1) SA 128 (A) of examining the allegedly infringing article to focus attention, while appreciating this should not influence interpretation. The Court commented on inconsistencies in scientific dictionaries, noting "So much for consistency in scientific dictionaries" when the same works that stated Vitamin E is an oil were used to argue it wasn't within the patent definition. Harms JA observed that one expert witness "may have hovered on the border of inadmissible evidence, a common occurrence during the course of this trial." The Court noted that if the respondent's use of Vitamin E was inventive, "the respondent may have been entitled to a selection patent or a dependent patent but that does not mean that the patent in suit does not cover its use."
This case is significant in South African patent law for its application and clarification of principles of patent interpretation. It emphasizes that patent specifications must be read as a whole and in context, rather than isolating particular sentences as definitions. The judgment reinforces that even express definitions in patent specifications must be read contextually and not treated as interpretation sections in statutes. The case illustrates the principle that preferred embodiments in a patent specification do not limit the scope of claims to only those embodiments. It confirms that the focus in interpreting functional limitations in patents should be on the function to be performed rather than on specific chemical compositions, unless clearly limited. The judgment also demonstrates the court's willingness to look beyond overly technical chemical classifications to the ordinary meaning and function of terms in their patent context. The case serves as an important reminder that patent interpretation requires careful attention to the inventor's intention as conveyed by the specification properly construed, not what may have been subjectively intended.