Marsha Dyers, a field ranger with 16 years of service, was dismissed by Cape Nature on 17 July 2017 for multiple charges of misconduct, including: gross negligence involving a quad bike; insubordination; unauthorised absenteeism totaling 33 days over three months (March-June 2017); refusal to complete routine documentation; and damage to employer's property (flinging a steel cabinet). The disciplinary inquiry proceeded in Dyers' absence on 26 June 2017, despite a medical certificate from Dr Saayman dated 22 June 2017 stating she was unfit for work from 1 June to 31 July 2017. The certificate was vague and backdated, and Dr Saayman had not conducted a proper examination or diagnosis at that time. Dyers did not testify at the arbitration; her defense was based on alleged mental incapacity rendering her unaccountable for her actions. Dyers' family members had approached her manager in May 2017 expressing concerns about her behavior. More than a year after dismissal, Dr George, a psychiatrist appointed by the board, diagnosed Dyers with bipolar disorder and confirmed she had suffered a manic episode at the time of the alleged misconduct. The arbitrator found the dismissal both procedurally and substantively unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement.
The finding that the dismissal was procedurally unfair was reviewed and set aside, substituted with a finding that the dismissal was procedurally fair. The finding that the dismissal was substantively unfair was upheld. The remedy of reinstatement with limited backpay (from approximately July 2018 to the date of the award) was maintained. No order as to costs.
An arbitrator conducting a de novo review of a dismissal for misconduct is entitled and obliged to consider expert medical evidence obtained after the dismissal when determining substantive fairness, applying the principle established in Strydom v Witzenberg Municipality. Where expert evidence establishes that an employee suffered from mental incapacity (such as bipolar disorder) at the time of alleged misconduct, and this incapacity explains the conduct, the employee cannot be held culpable for that conduct even if the formal diagnosis only occurred after dismissal. A procedural defect at the initial disciplinary inquiry (such as refusing to postpone for medical reasons based on inadequate medical evidence) may be cured by an adequate appeal process where the employee is given a reasonable opportunity to provide proper medical substantiation but fails to do so.
The court made observations about the adequacy of medical certificates for purposes of postponing disciplinary inquiries. Dr Saayman's initial certificate was deficient because it was vague, backdated to cover periods when the doctor had not examined the employee, and purported to explain conduct dating back months without any proper diagnosis. The court also noted that Dyers had a clean disciplinary record over 16 years of service and that her manager had regarded previous instances of difficult behavior as "minor irritations" not warranting discipline, which raised questions about the differential treatment of her recent conduct. The court observed that reinstatement was appropriate given Dr George's opinion that Dyers could work normally if she continued taking her medication.
This case is significant for clarifying the interaction between misconduct and incapacity in dismissal cases, particularly where mental illness may negate culpability for conduct that would otherwise constitute misconduct. It confirms that arbitrators in unfair dismissal disputes must consider relevant evidence obtained after dismissal, including medical diagnoses, when assessing substantive fairness (following Strydom v Witzenberg Municipality). The case demonstrates that employees cannot be held accountable for misconduct that is attributable to mental incapacity, even where the formal diagnosis only occurs after dismissal. It also reinforces the importance of appeal procedures in curing potential procedural defects at the initial inquiry stage, particularly where an employee is given a reasonable opportunity to provide medical substantiation but fails to do so.