The applicant was arrested and released on bail with a condition not to interfere with state witnesses on a fraud charge. In January 2021, he allegedly sent one Shadreck Homera to influence the complainant (a state witness) to withdraw the fraud charges and reach an out of court settlement. The Prosecutor General treated this as a separate offence of defeating or obstructing the course of justice under section 184(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] and arraigned the applicant before the magistrate, who placed him on remand. The applicant challenged this procedure, arguing that the proper procedure for alleged breach of bail conditions should have been an inquiry under section 127 or section 133 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], not the preferring of new criminal charges and placement on remand.
The court set aside the decision of the magistrate made on 20 March 2021 under case number CRB HRE P1893/21 and revoked the applicant's continued placement on remand. The proceedings and decision were quashed. Each party was ordered to pay its own costs. Judgment was entered for the applicant on 14 October 2021, with written reasons provided on 30 May 2022.
When an accused person who has been granted bail allegedly breaches a condition of that bail, the proper procedure is to conduct an inquiry in terms of section 127 or section 133 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], not to prefer fresh criminal charges arising from the alleged breach and place the accused on remand. It is only through the inquiry procedure that: (1) the court can satisfy itself that the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated; (2) the police and prosecutor can assess whether the accused, in breaching bail conditions, committed another offence for which separate charges may be preferred; and (3) if satisfied of the breach, the court may commit the person to prison. Preferring criminal charges based on an alleged bail breach without conducting the required inquiry constitutes a gross irregularity that justifies intervention by way of review in unterminated proceedings, particularly where fundamental rights are affected and the prejudice cannot be remedied after completion of the proceedings.
The court made general observations about the principles governing intervention in unterminated proceedings, citing Attorney-General v Makamba 2005 (2) ZLR 54 (S) and Isman & Ors v Additional Magistrate 1963 (1) SA 1(A), emphasizing that superior courts should be slow to intervene and should generally confine such intervention to rare cases where grave injustice would otherwise result or where justice might not by other means be obtained. The court noted that without such restraint, reviewing courts would be inundated with applications for review of uncompleted proceedings in magistrates' courts, and such applications could be used as a ploy to delay trials. The court also observed that it is pertinent for magistrates to acquaint themselves with the law relevant to cases before them, as failure to do so results in falling into pitfalls and dispensing injustice instead of real and substantial justice.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean criminal procedure law as it clarifies the proper procedure to be followed when an accused person allegedly breaches bail conditions. It reinforces that the appropriate mechanism is an inquiry under sections 127 or 133 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, not the preferring of separate criminal charges and placement on remand. The case also illustrates the exceptional circumstances under which the High Court will intervene in unterminated proceedings in lower courts - specifically where there is a gross irregularity causing grave injustice that affects fundamental rights and cannot be remedied after the proceedings are completed. The judgment emphasizes the importance of judicial officers acquainting themselves with the correct legal procedures and warns against procedural shortcuts that may result in injustice to accused persons.