The appellant, Mr Mamolatelo Alfred Selota, was admitted as an attorney on 1 August 2008 and practised under the name MA Selota Attorneys. In June 2018, the South African Legal Practice Council (respondent) launched an application for his removal from the roll of attorneys based on several grounds, including practising without a Fidelity Fund certificate in contravention of s 84(1) and (2) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014. An expert's inspection revealed substantial trust fund deficits and debit balances on clients' trust accounts. Shortly before the main application was to be heard on 21 November 2019, the appellant urgently applied for a declarator that he was entitled to a Fidelity Fund certificate for 2019. On 7 February 2020, the High Court suspended the appellant from practising pending finalisation of the main application. Van Olst AJ dismissed the appellant's application for a declarator on 9 March 2020 with costs on attorney and client scale, but granted leave to appeal. The appellant failed to timeously file heads of argument in the Supreme Court of Appeal, causing the appeal to lapse, and then sought condonation and reinstatement. The respondent had not issued a Fidelity Fund certificate for 2019 because it was not satisfied the appellant had complied with Chapter 7 of the LPA regarding trust monies.
1. The application for condonation and reinstatement of the appeal was dismissed with costs. 2. The main matter was struck from the roll with costs.
An appeal may be dismissed under s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 where the decision sought will have no practical effect or result. Where an appellant seeks a declarator that would not change the material facts upon which other subsisting court orders are based, the appeal will have no practical effect and should not be entertained. A retrospective declarator of entitlement to a Fidelity Fund certificate cannot undo the fact of past non-compliance with the Legal Practice Act, and therefore cannot affect orders based on that non-compliance.
The Court expressed serious doubt as to whether an application to set aside the suspension order should be entertained at all in the circumstances, given the multiple failed attempts to overturn it through various courts including the Constitutional Court. The Court also noted that the purpose of s 16(2)(a)(i) is to reduce the heavy workload of appeal courts and to ensure that matters truly deserving attention are not delayed by burdening courts with matters that fall within its ambit (citing Madibeng Local Municipality v DDP Valuers and Another [2020] ZASCA 70 para 22).
This case demonstrates the application of s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which permits appeal courts to dismiss matters where the decision sought will have no practical effect or result. It illustrates the principle that appeal courts will not expend resources on academic or moot issues, particularly where the relief sought cannot remedy the underlying problem that gave rise to other court orders. The judgment reinforces judicial economy and the need for appeals to have concrete practical consequences. It is also significant in the context of legal practitioners' regulation, showing that courts will not grant declaratory relief that would be ineffective in changing the regulatory consequences of past non-compliance with statutory requirements under the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014.