Mr Masemola was a recipient of a special pension in terms of the Special Pensions Act 69 of 1996. He was subsequently convicted of fraud, which resulted in his disqualification from receiving the special pension in terms of the provisions of the Act. On 21 July 2011, after applying, the respondent received a Presidential Pardon in terms of section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution. The provision of the Act under which he was awarded the special pension had lapsed in 2006. The respondent sought reinstatement of his special pension on the basis of the Presidential Pardon granted in 2011. The Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria found in favor of the respondent, prompting the Special Pensions Appeal Board and the Government Pensions Administration Agency to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was upheld. The judgment of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria was set aside. No order was made as to costs.
A Presidential Pardon granted in terms of section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution does not have the effect of reinstating a special pension that was forfeited due to a criminal conviction where the statutory provision under which the pension was originally granted has lapsed. The disqualifying provision of the Special Pensions Act 69 of 1996 is not discarded by virtue of a Presidential Pardon. Where a provision of an Act has lapsed on the basis of the principle of legality, there is no statutory basis for reinstatement of benefits previously granted under that provision, even where a Presidential Pardon has been granted after the lapsing of the provision.
The media summary does not contain sufficient detail to extract specific obiter dicta. The summary focuses on the core legal principles applied by the Court. Any broader observations about the nature and effect of Presidential Pardons, or commentary on the policy considerations underlying the Special Pensions Act, would require access to the full judgment.
This case is significant in South African law as it clarifies the scope and legal effect of a Presidential Pardon granted under section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution. It establishes that a Presidential Pardon does not automatically remove statutory disqualifications or create entitlements that did not exist at the time the pardon was granted. The judgment reinforces the principle of legality in administrative law, particularly in relation to social security benefits. It also demonstrates that a pardon, while it may have certain legal effects, does not operate retroactively to revive lapsed statutory provisions or create new rights where the underlying legislative basis has ceased to exist. This has important implications for the interaction between executive pardons and statutory entitlements in South African administrative law.