Ex-Constable Marumisa v The Chairman Police Service Commission and Others

The applicant, an ex-constable in the Zimbabwe Republic Police, was driving an unregistered public service vehicle on 25 June 2015 when he lost control and collided with another vehicle, injuring six passengers. This occurred after the 2nd respondent (Commissioner General of Police) had suspended all police officers from involvement in passenger transportation business. The applicant was convicted of negligent driving and sentenced to a fine of $150 or 60 days imprisonment, plus six months imprisonment wholly suspended for 5 years. The 2nd respondent discharged him from the police service with effect from 15 January 2016 in terms of section 48(a) of the Police Act for misconduct. The applicant appealed to the 1st respondent (Police Service Commission) on 18 January 2016 in terms of section 51 of the Police Act. However, the 2nd respondent did not reinstate him pending the appeal. On 2 June 2016, the 1st respondent dismissed the appeal, and the applicant was notified by letter received on 6 June 2016. The applicant filed this review application on 12 July 2016.

• Whether the 2nd respondent's failure to reinstate the applicant pending his appeal in terms of section 51 of the Police Act was wrongful and unlawful
• Whether the failure to reinstate the applicant pending appeal rendered the dismissal null and void
• Whether the 1st respondent was obliged to furnish written reasons for dismissing the appeal without being requested to do so
• Whether the applicant was entitled to reinstatement in terms of section 68(2) of the Constitution on grounds of non-provision of reasons
• The interpretation and effect of section 51 of the Police Act and section 68 of the Constitution read with the Administrative Justice Act

The application was dismissed without an order of costs.

1. Section 51 of the Police Act is peremptory and grants an automatic stay of execution pending determination of an appeal - the 2nd respondent must reinstate an appellant pending appeal determination. 2. However, failure to reinstate pending appeal does not automatically nullify the final decision of the Police Service Commission on the appeal. 3. Section 68(2) of the Constitution, which grants the right to written reasons for administrative conduct, does not impose an automatic obligation to furnish reasons without a request. The Administrative Justice Act complements section 68 of the Constitution and requires an affected person to request reasons within a reasonable period. 4. An applicant cannot seek to nullify an administrative decision on grounds of non-provision of reasons when he failed to request such reasons in the first place as required by the Administrative Justice Act.

The court observed that it had stated elsewhere that section 68 of the Constitution does not oblige administrative decision-makers to furnish, without a request, reasons for every single action taken in the country, referring to Ex Sgt Maphosa & Ors v Chairman of the Police Service Commission & Ors HB-257-17 and South African Police Service & Ors v Mamela & Anor 2003 (S) SA 4801. The court also observed that the obligations imposed by section 68 are binding on every person, natural or juristic, involving the State and all executive, legislature and judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative law as it clarifies the relationship between section 68(2) of the Constitution (right to administrative justice and written reasons) and the Administrative Justice Act. It establishes that while there is a constitutional right to written reasons for administrative decisions, this right must be activated by a request from the affected person - it is not automatic. The case also confirms the mandatory nature of section 51 of the Police Act requiring reinstatement pending appeal, though such procedural irregularity does not necessarily invalidate the final decision on appeal. The judgment provides important guidance on procedural requirements in administrative law matters and the interaction between constitutional rights and statutory procedures.