Ex-Constable Charity Mudzvova v The Commissioner General of Police and The Police Service Commission

The applicant, a former member of the Zimbabwe police force, filed multiple applications including HC 3161/18 (spoliatory order), HC 3163/18 (declaratur, dismissed on 27 November 2018), and the current HC 852/19 (review). She claimed that in February 2017, her son fell seriously ill and was admitted to Parirenyatwa Hospital. She alleged she sought and received permission from her immediate superior at Featherstone Police Station to remain with her breastfeeding child in hospital. Upon returning to work after her son's discharge, she was informed she had been discharged from the police service for desertion. She claimed her property was auctioned and she was not given reasons for her discharge. She wrote to the first respondent on 29 November 2018 requesting reasons for her discharge and filed the review application on 6 February 2019. The respondents contended she was discharged on 6 February 2017 for desertion following a Board of Inquiry convened on 10 March 2017 under s 72(1) of the Police Act. The reasons for discharge, including radio signal and Board of Inquiry findings, were attached to the notice of opposition filed in HC 3161/18 on 24 April 2018.

• Whether the review application was filed within the time limits prescribed by Order 33 Rule 259 of the High Court Rules, 1971
• Whether the applicant had been furnished with reasons for her discharge from the police service
• Whether the discharge from the police service was lawful and procedurally fair
• Whether the applicant's failure to seek condonation for late filing was fatal to her application
• Whether the applicant's credibility was undermined by inconsistencies and false evidence

The application was dismissed with costs.

A review application filed outside the time limits prescribed by Order 33 Rule 259 of the High Court Rules, 1971 without an application for condonation is fatally defective and must be dismissed. A litigant who is aware of the reasons for an administrative decision cannot later claim ignorance and write letters requesting reasons in an attempt to create a fresh starting point for calculating time limits for review. Where a litigant gives false evidence under oath, the court will discard their story and draw adverse inferences against them as if no evidence was given. A founding affidavit that requires substantiation which the applicant can provide but fails to provide is unsatisfactory, and where the opposing papers present a different version of events, this creates an unresolvable material dispute of fact on the papers.

The court expressed strong disapproval of litigants who lie under oath, observing that such conduct wastes the court's time and that of the adversary, makes a mockery of the oath taken, and leaves the court unable to determine which statements to believe. The court noted that the applicant appeared to be a frequent litigant who had filed multiple applications regarding the same underlying dispute. The court commented that people who lie under oath "make a nonsense of the oath which they take" and observed that "the best is to disbelieve them all." The judge noted with "some disquiet" that the applicant's avowed intention was to withhold information she had known since July 2018, and that her lying was intended to persuade the court to assist in her reinstatement, not realizing that discovered lies would never persuade the court to favor a dishonest litigant.

This case reinforces several important principles in Zimbabwean administrative and procedural law: (1) the peremptory nature of time limits for review applications under Order 33 Rule 259 and the necessity of seeking condonation for late filing; (2) the duty of candor litigants owe to the court and the consequences of providing false evidence under oath; (3) the court's intolerance for abuse of process and attempts to mislead the court; (4) the importance of substantiating factual allegations with documentary evidence where such evidence should reasonably be available; and (5) that litigants cannot manufacture compliance with procedural requirements by artificially creating a fresh cause of action when they were already aware of the relevant facts.