The late Rose Dziruni had filed an application under HC 4028/04 against the respondent seeking an order compelling transfer of stand number 2703 Bulawayo Township (16, 18th Avenue, Famona, Bulawayo) pursuant to a sale agreement dated 4 June 2001. The application was opposed but not set down for argument before Rose Dziruni died on 6 July 2008. Her son, Obvious Dziruni, was appointed executor of her estate on 30 September 2008. Prior to her death, on 17 January 2007, the respondent had applied for dismissal of Rose Dziruni's application for want of prosecution (HC 66/07), which she opposed. The respondent, unaware of Rose Dziruni's death, made another application (HC 29/09) for leave to set down HC 66/07 on the unopposed roll. The order was granted on 16 January 2009. The respondent then obtained an order on 25 June 2009 dismissing HC 4028/04 for want of prosecution. Both orders were thus made against a deceased person without substitution of the executor. The executor filed a rescission application (HC 1225/09) which was opposed by the respondent, but later withdrew it on 7 October 2010.
1. The orders made in Case No. HC 66/07 on 25 June 2009 and in Case No. HC 29/09 on 16 January 2009 were rescinded. 2. The executor of the estate late Rose Dziruni, namely Obvious Dziruni, was substituted as Applicant in Case No. HC 4028/04 to prosecute that application to finality. 3. Each party to bear its own costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Proceedings cannot continue after the death of a party until an executor has been appointed and substituted as the party to the proceedings; (2) Judgment cannot be taken against a deceased person; (3) Orders obtained against a deceased person without substitution of the executor are made in error and are liable to be set aside; (4) A court has the power mero motu under Rule 449 (equivalent to Rule 42 in South African practice) to rescind orders that were erroneously sought or granted in the absence of a party affected, or as a result of a mistake common to the parties, regardless of whether a formal rescission application is pursued; (5) The court's power to rescind orders mero motu exists independently of any application by the parties and survives the withdrawal of a rescission application where the error is apparent on the record.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The withdrawal of the rescission application by the applicant was "ill advised and probably informed by the perception that the application was out of time"; (2) "There was no merit whatsoever in the opposition to the application" - indicating the court's view that the respondent's opposition was frivolous; (3) "It is amazing that the Respondent saw it fit to oppose the rescission of judgment application when it was pretty obvious he had erroneously sought an order against a dead person and the court had also wallowed in the same error"; (4) The court noted that "If the application had not been withdrawn the Respondent would have been visited with punitive costs" - suggesting that the opposition was not only without merit but deserving of a punitive costs order; (5) The court noted its decision to substitute the executor as applicant "in order to expedite the matter" even though no application had been made for such substitution, indicating the court's willingness to take proactive steps to avoid further procedural delays.
This case reinforces fundamental principles of civil procedure in Zimbabwe (and applicable to South African law as well) that: (1) legal proceedings cannot continue against a deceased person without proper substitution of the executor or legal representative; (2) any orders obtained against a deceased person are void and made in error; (3) courts have inherent power under their rules (equivalent to Rule 42 of the South African Uniform Rules) to mero motu rescind orders made in error, even where a party has withdrawn a rescission application; and (4) procedural fairness requires that all parties affected by litigation must be properly before the court. The case serves as a warning against taking procedural advantage when opposing parties have died and highlights the court's willingness to correct manifest injustices arising from procedural irregularities.