The applicant was convicted of murder on 17 July 2020 as defined in section 47(1)(b) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act) and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. On 22 July 2020, he filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court followed by a bail application. On 23 September 2020, the Supreme Court struck off the bail application for failure to comply with section 44(2)(b) of the High Court Act and rule 18(1) of the Supreme Court Rules Act, 2018, as the applicant had not sought leave to appeal from the High Court. The notice of appeal was withdrawn. The applicant then applied to the High Court on 6 October 2020 for an extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal. The underlying facts related to events on 22 May 2019 when the applicant caught up with the deceased, who had no injuries at that time. He disappeared with her for approximately three and a half hours (8 pm to 11:40 pm). When he returned with her, she was stark naked, unconscious, only groaning, and remained comatose until she died on 25 May 2019. The applicant kept the seriously injured person in his car and at home overnight without seeking immediate medical attention. The post mortem report showed severe injuries consistent with callous assault, not with jumping from a moving vehicle as the applicant claimed.
The application for condonation for the filing of an application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
In applications for condonation of late filing of applications for leave to appeal in criminal matters, the court must exercise its discretion judicially considering all relevant factors including: (1) the degree of lateness; (2) the explanation for the delay; (3) the merits of the case; and (4) the prospects of success on appeal. All factors are interrelated and none is decisive on its own. Even where the delay is not inordinate and has been satisfactorily explained (including by legal practitioner negligence supported by affidavit), condonation will not be granted unless the applicant establishes reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The test for reasonable prospects of success requires a dispassionate decision based on facts and law that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court - more than a mere possibility of success or an arguable case; there must be a sound, rational basis for concluding there are realistic prospects of success. Section 70(5) of the Zimbabwe Constitution does not confer an absolute right of appeal; reasonable time limitations for noting appeals and seeking condonation are permissible restrictions.
The court observed that there is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the results of his attorney's lack of diligence and dilatoriness, otherwise this might have a disastrous effect upon the observance of court rules. The court noted the increase in applications for condonation based on legal practitioner negligence, and indicated that courts are less inclined to take a benevolent view of such negligence. The court emphasized that considerations ad misericordiam (appeals to pity) should not become an invitation to laxity. The court distinguished the case from George Tanyanyiwa Chikanga v The State where the delay was nineteen months (inordinate) and the legal practitioner did not file a supporting affidavit, whereas in this case the delay was only about one month and the legal practitioner filed a corroborating affidavit.
This case clarifies the application of condonation principles in Zimbabwe for late applications for leave to appeal in criminal matters. It demonstrates that while courts may take a more lenient view where legal practitioners file supporting affidavits explaining their negligence and the delay is not inordinate, this is not dispositive - the applicant must still demonstrate reasonable prospects of success. The case also affirms that section 70(5) of the Zimbabwe Constitution does not confer an absolute or unlimited right of appeal, and that reasonable time limitations and procedural requirements for noting appeals are constitutionally permissible restrictions. The judgment emphasizes the importance of legal practitioners familiarizing themselves with the legislative framework and jurisprudence on leave to appeal, and warns against laxity in observing court rules.